

1968/9  
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Contents checked  
for transfer to  
D.R.O.

*R. P. Osborne*  
(187)

Date 30/10/70

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE

DEPT.

NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. NEQ 10/1

(1 to 65).  
(Part A.)

TITLE: IRAQ

*Sale of Aircraft and Associated  
Equipment to the Iraqi Government.*

W  
18

REFER TO

REFER TO

REFER TO

NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Registry		23/10	<del>Regy</del>		30/1	Regy		5/5.
DTSD	(2)	1/11	<del>D.S.M.</del>		38	P.H.		5/5
DJM	(7)		<del>P.M.M.</del>		5/12	Regy		16/5
Registry		8/11	<del>Regy</del>		6/2	P.H.		11/5
DJM	(11)		<del>P.H.</del>		11/2	Regy		13/6
	(12)(13)	28/11	<del>Regy</del>		14/2	P.H.		13/6
Regy		4/12	<del>Regy</del>		19/2	Regy		2/7
DJM	(21)		<del>P.H.</del>		19/2	P.H.		2/7
<del>Dis. Nelson</del>	<del>21/1</del>	11.12	<del>Regy</del>		27/2	P.H.		2/7
Regy			<del>P.H.</del>		5/3	DTSD (as above)	65	2/7
NE. Regy			<del>Regy</del>		17/3	P.H.		2/7
DJM	22-23	12/12	<del>P.H.</del>		18/3	Regy		9/8
Regy		23/12	<del>Regy</del>		24/3			
D.S.M.	24	23/12	<del>P.H.</del>		24/1			
DTSD		31/12	<del>Regy</del>		26/3			
NE Regy		1/09	<del>P.H.</del>		21/3			
Regy		14/1	<del>Regy</del>		9/4			
D.S.M.		15/1	<del>A.A.A.</del>		9/4			
Regy		15/1	<del>Mr Hinchcliffe</del>		11/4			
D.S.M.		18/1	<del>Mr Munn</del>		14/4			

Registry Address

Room No. 115  
F. O. Building,  
Downing Street.

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1968/9

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RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

PART

FILE No. NEQ 10/1

(3976) D.



**TELEGRAM****DRAFT****CABLE / SAVINGRAM**Date &  
T.O.D.

16-X-68

①

Serial No.

STOW 5

17

ORIGINAL and FOUR legible carbon copies, all on Avmin Form 97, typed (or in BLOCK CAPITALS if in manuscript) on one side only, are required. Failure to send the correct number of copies may result in transmission delay.

\*No. of copies to teleprinter if available

NEQ 10/1

†Priority marking:

**IMMEDIATE****ORIGINATING OFFICER**

TO:

**BAGHDAD**

in R. Evans

(Name) **C. B. Benjamin**

FOR:

Rank **Principal**FROM: **Benjamin, EIR.1(a), Mintoeh.**Branch **EIR.1(a), Mintoeh.**

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

Building **Castlewood Hse.**Room **404** Ext. **906**Date **16.10.68.**

Please pass following message to Brown, B.A.C.,  
in Baghdad, from Hobday, B.A.C., Warton.

**COUNTERSIGNED**

Signed

Rank **Principal**Branch **EIR.1(a), Mintoeh.**Date **16.10.68.****DISTRIBUTION :-**

Originator

**EIR.1(a), Mintoeh.****INFORMATION COPIES TO :-****SEEN DISTRIBUTION****D.S.D., F.O.****EASTERN DEPT., F.O.**File No. **AP/TI/65****AP/TI/02**

oh!

Thank you for your cable of 14 October. Somewhat confused your para. 3, however will spell it out clearly. Our prices contained in our offer 1st October, 1968, cannot be accepted as a fixed price without escalation under present circumstances and suggest that for a fixed price you increase by 7% for delivery in two years' time. You must persuade customer that our price of 1st October plus escalation on a standard formula acceptable to British Government with an absolute ceiling is best and fairest method of doing business and would agree with you that a ceiling can be established on this if necessary but we would not wish to have business at our price quotation of 1st October without escalation clause or some other means of achieving this.

2. In relation to your para. 7, individual acting on behalf of our good friend Abdul Basak and therefore obviously has good connections with influential persons so please negotiate reduction of our commitment with Abadi to take account of this.

3. Please comment urgently on your view regarding sales potential.

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

\*Delete as appropriate



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L.H. 4BT



MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR 1(a),

Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford Street, LONDON W.C.1

Telex: 2224I Telegrams: Mintec London Telex

Telephone: 01-636 3644, ext. 906


Your reference:

Any communication on the  
subject of this letter should be  
addressed to:

THE SECRETARY

and the following reference quoted:

AP/77/05



23rd October, 1968.

*Ian Brown*

Aircraft for Iraq

Mr. Ian Brown of BAC telephoned me today on his return from Baghdad. He reported that he had not been able to obtain an interview with the Minister of Defence, and his conclusion is that at this juncture Hardan Tikriti does not wish to become too overtly interested in the BAC Lightning proposal, and would rather play this on the basis of being persuaded by his staff officers that this aircraft would be the appropriate purchase. Mr. Brown fed all the information about prices, deliveries, etc., on the Lightning into the Iraqi Air Force Commander, and he understands that the next move is for the IAF to prepare a submission in order to gain Cabinet clearance to pursue negotiations with BAC further.

Mr. Brown says that he made every effort to keep our Embassy in the picture on the way in which his discussions were proceeding. On the other hand, this report is still only BAC's view, and we should like to have some corroboration on the present state of affairs through our Embassy, since we need to be reasonably sure of the position before preparing papers for submission to Ministers.

As you know, both we and MOD are concerned that whatever proposal for purchasing Lightnings may emerge, if any, this should from the outset take full account of the training, particularly air crew, requirement, and in trying to establish the present state of Iraqi thinking on the Lightning, perhaps the Embassy could also encourage IAF/RAF discussions on these issues.

I am copying this letter to Murray (Defence Supply) and Whitmore (DS8, MOD).

*Yours*

*Chris Benjamin*

(C.B. BENJAMIN)

D. Makinson, Esq.,  
Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
King Charles Street,  
London, S.W.1.

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3

NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT,

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,  
S.W.1.

28 October, 1968.

NEO 10/1

Aircraft for Iraq

2

I enclose a copy of a letter from Benjamin in the Ministry of Technology which gives Brown's fairly optimistic account of his dealings in Baghdad.

2. Perhaps you would let us have your views on the last two lines of paragraph 2, and on paragraph 3.

(D. J. Wilkinson)

A. E. Saunders, Esq.,  
Baghdad.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: B.D. AIREY, Assistant Secretary/Egypt and International  
Relations Division 1,

4

Ref. 1073

Our Reference: AP/77/03

24th October, 1968.

NT E

Military Assistance for Iraq

In Cotterill's letter of 17th September (see referred to BAC's current negotiations with Iraq for the sale of forty lightnings, and the credit cover that would be appropriate.

We should certainly want to support the application of Section 2 cover but, whilst five years credit is a reasonable basis for BAC's initial approach to the new Iraqi government, the latter are likely to seek a longer period. Although the French offer of Mirages seems to have run into the ground, the French proposal is still on the table for the Iraqis to pick up, if only to squeeze the best terms out of BAC. Moreover, it is likely that the Russians will also be pressing the Iraqis to purchase a version of the Mig and, from what we know of their aircraft sales tactics, these are likely to be proffered at marked-down prices and very extended payment terms.

These are, of course, early days in negotiations with the new regime, and my purpose in writing is to say that although five years is a reasonable basis for BAC to put in their initial offer, we may well be pressed to extend our credit terms to a longer period in order to match the competition.

I am copying this letter to addressees of Cotterill's.

B. D. AIREY

C.C. Lucas, Esq.,  
H.M. Treasury,  
London, S.W.1.

Copy to: Hd. IG82, Nintech.

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
SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A  
PRIORITY BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 378

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
31 OCTOBER 1968

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NO 378 OF 31 OCTOBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BOARD OF TRADE  
AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.



LIGHTNINGS.

PLEASE ASK BENJAMIN OF MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY TO  
PASS FOLLOWING TO BROWN B A C.

(A) ABADI HAS INFORMED US THAT TAKRITI CATEGORICALLY  
WANTS TO BUY LIGHTNINGS AND FULLY INTENDS TO DO SO.  
HOWEVER, HE IS SHORT OF MONEY AND HAS ASKED WHETHER  
B A C COULD OFFER CREDIT. ABADI TOLD HIM THAT  
B A C HAD ALREADY ENVISAGED THIS AND HAD SPOKEN IN TERMS  
OF NINE YEARS AT 5 TO 5 AND A HALF PER CENT. ABADI CONSIDERS IT  
IMPORTANT THAT WHEN YOU NEXT VISIT BAGHDAD YOU SHOULD  
BRING A FIRM OFFER OF CREDIT WHICH IS COMPETITIVE WITH  
FRENCH MIRAGE CONTRACT WHICH ENVISAGED A 9 YEAR CREDIT  
AT 5 PER CENT. FRENCH HAVE RENEWED THEIR OFFER OF MIRAGE  
FIGHTERS.

(B) ABADI AS LEARNED THAT BAATH REGIONAL COMMAND  
COUNCIL HAS APPROVED PURCHASE OF LIGHTNINGS AS PART  
OF ITS AUTHORISATION TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
TO BUY ARMS NEEDED FOR DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

(C) ABADI THINKS  
THAT YOU MAY BE REQUESTED TO VISIT BAGHDAD VERY SOON TO  
OPEN DETAILED DISCUSSIONS.

F C O PASS TO BOARD OF TRADE AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE.

MR. EVANS

/COPIES SENT TO MOD, M/TECHNOLOGY (CASTLEWOOD) AND  
BOARD OF TRADE/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
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D.T. & S.D.  
DEFENCE POLICY DEPT.  
MILITARY ADVISER  
P.U.S.D.

SECRET



TELEGRAM SECTION  
Room 124 K.C.S  
Communications Department

N. East

YTC/1

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

378 from Baghdad

TO:

Arms Working Party des.

(Signed) .....

(Department) .....

(Date) .....

Action taken in Communications Department :

(Initials) ..... (Date) 1/14 .....

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO  
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION



To: Mr. P.D. Graham

*Ref 25/10*

*With the Compliments of*

B.D. AIREY.

~~IS/EIR1~~

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford St.,  
London, W.C.1.

*Mr Beaumont  
Eastern Dept.*

24.10.68

ADMIN. FORM 142

*DM 29/10  
P.E.*



Entered NEQ 2/2  
Copy 6 - NEQ 10/10  
NEQ 1/2  
⑥  
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CYPHER/CAT.A.

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NO. 385

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

2 NOVEMBER 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED BAGHDAD.

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NO. 385 OF 2 NOVEMBER REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN TEHRAN WASHINGTON UKMIS  
NEW YORK AND CAIRO

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

THE SUBJECTS LIKELY TO BE RAISED BY TIKRITI AND SHAIKHLI DURING  
THEIR VISITS ARE

(A) SAUDI ARABIAN AND KUWAITI SUPPORT IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS  
TO SHAH ON THE KURDISH PROBLEM. (SHAH IS REPORTED TO BE VISITING  
SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT DURING WEEK BEGINNING 9 NOVEMBER).

(B) POSSIBLE LOANS. THE BAATH OBTAINED A £30 MILLION LOAN FROM  
KUWAIT IN 1963.

(C) GIVEN IRAQI INTEREST IN THE PURCHASE OF LIGHTNINGS AND  
DELAY IN DELIVERY DATE, POSSIBILITY OF A QUOTE SWITCH UNQUOTE  
TO IRAQ OF PLANES ALREADY ORDERED BY SAUDI ARABIA OR KUWAIT OR  
BOTH. see also  
②5

(D) THE GULF AND IN PARTICULAR IRANIAN POLICY AND ESTABLISHMENT  
OF THE U.A.E.

2. THE TOUR IS CLEARLY PART OF NEW REGIMES EFFORT TO PUT IRAQ  
ON MAP OR TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT. MINISTER OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS RECENTLY VISITED PRAGUE WARSAW AND PARIS ON HIS WAY TO  
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN AND ROUTINE  
TO TEHRAN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND CAIRO

MR. EVANS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
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NORTH AFRICAN DEPT.  
ARABIAN DEPT.  
DEFENCE POLICY DEPT.  
P.U.S.D.  
INFORMATION RESEARCH DEPT.  
RESEARCH DEPT.  
NEWS DEPT.  
INFORMATION POLICY DEPT.

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7


TOP COPY

Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 390

5 November, 1968



NE

CONFIDENTIAL

1

Your telegram No. STOW 5.

Following for Benjamin, EIR. 1(A), Ministry of Technology.

We confirm that the information in our telegram No. 378 to FCO derived from Abadi/Takriti Meeting after Brown's visit. Meeting took place on 29 October.

pa. [signature] 6/11

Mr. Evans.

/ Passed to Ministry of Technology /  
/ Copies sent to M.O.D.; Ministry of Technology (Castlewood) and Board of Trade. /

Why B.O.T. ?

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Near Eastern Department.  
D.T. & S.D.  
Defence Policy Department.  
Military Staff  
P.U.S.D.

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Cypher/Cat A

BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

elno. 387

5 November, 1968

RECEIVED IN No. 15 368 NER 10/1
--

NE ⑧  
new tech  
improved  
I will take up  
question of routing  
p.s.  
Jm 8/11

SECRET

5  
Addressed to FCO telegram No. 387 of 5 November. Repeated for information to Ministry of Defence and Board of Trade.

My telegram No. 378: Lightnings.

Please ask Benjamin Ministry of Technology to inform Brown that, according to Abbadi, Council of Ministers have approved Tikriti's intention to purchase Lightnings giving Tikriti freedom to negotiate conditions of purchase in the most advantageous way.

FCO pass to M.O.D and Board of Trade.

Mr. Evans.

/ SENT TO D.C.C. /

/ Copies passed to Board of Trade /

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
Near Eastern Department  
D.T. & S.D.  
Defence Policy Department.  
P.U.S.D.

SECRET

XXXXXX





## MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR 1(a),  
Room 405,

Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford Street, LONDON W.C.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex

Telephone: 01-636 3644, ext. 450

Our reference: AP/77/05

Your reference:



*Reg & submit soon.  
Submission 13/11 Jm 11*

8th November 1968

Dear *Donald*

Demonstration of an RAF  
Lightning aircraft in Iraq

I mentioned in our telephone conversation today that BAC Ltd have suggested that it would help the prospect of Lightning sales to Iraq if an RAF Lightning could be demonstrated in Iraq to senior members of the Government, and are seeking agreement to BAC action, which could result in such a request being put to HMG by the Iraqi Government.

BAC have in mind the possibility of a Mk.3 Lightning based on Cyprus being used for this purpose which could be flown to Baghdad with "in-flight" refuelling assistance.

As this suggestion has political overtones I agreed to put the matter to you in writing for consideration before asking MOD D.S.8(a) to comment on the possibilities of such an exercise.

A copy of this goes to Clive Whitmore of D.S.8(a).

Yours sincerely,

*J.P.*

(J.P.SHEEN)

D. Makinson Esq.,  
North Eastern Dept.,  
Foreign Office,  
King Charles Street,  
London S.W.1.



NEA 101

YTC/1

TELEGRAM SECTION  
Room 124 K.C.S  
Communications Department

NEA Eastern Dept.

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

70 387. From Baghdad. - 5-11-68.

TO:

Arms Working Party distribution.

(Signed) .....

(Department) .....

(Date) .....

Action taken in Communications Department :

(Initials) ...  .....

(Date) ... 6-11-68 .....

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO  
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION



**PRIORITY** **STON UNNUMBERED** **SENT 8.11.68**  
**TO:- BAGHDAD**  
**FROM: KIR 1(A) KINTECH, CASTLEWOOD HOUSE, LONDON**  
**SECRET**

*Jan 13/11*  
*Reg*  
*in Evans*  
*R.E.*  
*12/11*  
*10*

**BROWN OF B.A.C. MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR TELEGRAMS RELAYING**  
**INFORMATION FROM ABADI WHICH SUGGESTS SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS STOP**  
**B.A.C. ARE CONFIDENT OF OBTAINING FULLEST SUPPORT FROM E.C.C.D. AND**  
**THEIR BANKERS WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO OFFER CREDIT FACILITIES AND**  
**TERMS NO LESS FAVOURABLE THAN THOSE OF THE FRENCH WHICH BROWN WILL**  
**BRING IF HE RECEIVES A SURROUND FROM IRAQI AUTHORITIES WHICH HE**  
**NOW HOPEFULLY WAITS.**



**CRIS:V KIR 1A**

**INFO:- U.S./KIR KINTECH**

**A.S./KIR 1 "**

**D.T.S.D. (F.C.O.)**

**WOMEN EASTERN DEPT. (F.C.O.)**

**(MR. MARINSON)**

**FILE NO:- AP/TV/68**



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L.H. 4ET



**MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY**

**EIR1 (a)**


Castlewood House, 77-91 New Oxford Street, LONDON W.C.1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintec London Telex

Telephone: 01-636 3644, ext.

reference **AP/77/05**

Your reference:



*Mr Reg & Submitt w. pp*  
*Reply at 15*  
**15th November, 1968.**

*Mr*  
*Don 13/11*

*Dear Donald,*

**Lightnings for Iraq**

... I am attaching a letter that I have written today to Clive Whitmore suggesting a line to be taken with the Iraqis in any requests for training assistance.

At the moment, according to BAC's man-on-the-spot, the Lightning proposals are moving favourably through the Iraqi Ministry of Defence. At best, this could only be viewed as a partial opinion, and, indeed, we have heard from a representative of Hawker Siddeley who recently accompanied their team in giving a presentation of the Harrier to the Iraqis that the BAC proposition does not seem to be much of a prospect. They also said that their information was that the French had renewed pressure on Iraq to honour the Letter of Intent signed by the previous regime, and the Iraqis could well be buckling to this pressure.

At the moment, therefore, we do not really have any clear indication of what the Iraqis are really proposing to do over the Lightning. We are also conscious that a submission needs to be prepared for Ministers giving the up-to-date position since our earlier submission to SEOC in March of this year. To do this, we should welcome a full assessment by our Ambassador of our prospects, and the likely timing of any decision by the Iraqis. Perhaps you could be good enough to seek such a report from our Embassy.

*Yours,*

*Chris Benjamin*

**C. B. Benjamin**

**D. Makinson, Esq.,  
Eastern Department,  
Foreign Office,  
London, S.W. 1.**



**HR1 (a)****AP/77/05****15th November, 1968.****Lightning to Iraq - training assistance**

Following on our telephone conversation, in view of the request that we understand has been received from the Iraqi Air Attache for RAF training assistance perhaps I could just outline the present state of BAC's Lightning proposals for Iraq.

BAC have now formally submitted a proposal to supply 4 Lightning, which together with associated armaments and spares, etc., would be worth some £2m in the first instance, though, over time, with further spares orders, engine overhaul work, etc., the overall value could be £70-80m. The firm's proposal is stated to be current for 60 days, and was submitted on 1st October. Judging by the reports that we have relayed on to BAC from their contact-man in Iraq, the latter's interpretation of events is that things are moving favourably for BAC.

C. B. BENJAMIN

On the other hand, we learn from other commercial sources that the French have removed pressure on Iraq to honour their signature of a Letter of Intent to buy a package of Mirages, and within the factional political scene in Iraq we cannot be sure that the Russians are not busy pulling strings in favour of some Mig deal.

In these circumstances, it would be useful in keeping BAC's proposal to the fore if we could show a well-disposed attitude towards any requests for training assistance put forward by the Iraqis, including training other than specifically for Lightning conversion, for one of the principal factors that may be swinging the IAF towards the Lightning is the desire to keep in contact with RAF methods, procedures and disciplines rather than fragment the training background of their Air Force staff still further by introducing French procedures in addition to those that they have already absorbed from their flirtations with the Russians. At the same time, it would be not out of place to imply, behind the most helpful smile, that the Iraqi rating for training places would stand higher if they purchased British as opposed to French or Russian aircraft.

On the prospects for Lightning training, perhaps I could recall the suggestion in my letter of 14th August to John Haynes for training half a dozen

/or

C. A. Whitmore, Esq.,  
DSB (a),  
Ministry of Defence,  
Whitehall, S.W. 1.



(a) 1211

AP/7702

15th November, 1958.

SECRET

SECRET

or as of their Hunter off in the lightning, which is a production  
 eyes for their aircraft is passing, so that they should be reasonably  
 self-sufficient, assuming that they also purchase simulators, from the  
 date when their aircraft are actually delivered. The advantage of this  
 approach is that the Iraqis could feel that they were actively doing  
 something towards establishing their Lightning force even in the absence  
 of the aircraft, and, in terms of timescale, this is important to get  
 against the French offer of training, which was to involve 10 pilots  
 within 12 months.

I am copying this letter to David Butler and Desmond O'Hara.  
 In the first instance, though, over time, with further spare orders, and  
 together with associated armaments and spares, etc., would be sent to Iraq.  
 is stated to be current for 60 days, and was submitted on 1st October. The  
 by the reports that we have relayed on to BAC from their contact-man in Iraq,  
 the latter's interpretation of events is that things are moving favourably for

C. B. BENJAMIN

BAC.

On the other hand, we learn from other commercial sources that the French  
 have renewed pressure on Iraq to accept a letter of intent to  
 buy a package of missiles, and within the last few weeks in Iraq we  
 cannot be sure that the Russians are not busy pulling strings in favour of some  
 big deal.

In these circumstances, it would be useful in keeping BAC's proposal to the  
 fore if we could show a well-disposed attitude towards any requests for training  
 assistance and forward by the Iraqis, including training other than specifically  
 for Lightning conversion, for one of the principal factors that may be reducing  
 the IAF towards the Lightning is the desire to keep in contact with RAF methods,  
 procedures and disciplines rather than fragment the training background of their  
 air force staff still further by introducing French procedures in addition to  
 those that they have already absorbed from their relations with the Russians.  
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 suggestion in my letter of 15th August to John Payne for training half a dozen

/or

C. A. Whitmore, Rep.  
 D88 (a)  
 Ministry of Defence  
 Whitehall, S.W. 1.





(10/3)

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

9 November 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

*For Ministry of Defence and Technology.*

*Mr. de T...*

*minute. 17/11/68  
pa 17/11/68*


(12)

Lightnings for Iraq

Donald Makinson in his letter NEQ of 28 October 1968 asks for our views on Brown's optimistic accounts of his dealings in Baghdad. I can confirm that he maintained close touch with us here and he saw either Geoffrey Hancock or myself on many occasions, keeping us fully informed of the progress of his negotiations. He also called on the Ambassador, more than once in fact.

2. It is hard to say whether the Iraqis are really serious about the Lightnings. Undoubtedly they gave Brown the impression that they were and this impression is confirmed by the reports of Brigadier Abadi that the Council of Ministers have approved Takriti's intention to purchase Lightnings (our telegram number 387 to F.C.O.). Abadi was Commander of the Iraqi Air Force at the time of the July 1958 Revolution and although he belongs to the old régime, maintains good contacts with the Air Force today. We can reasonably hope therefore that his information is accurate.

3. On the other hand, we have had reports to the effect that the Iraqis will not go for Lightnings after all. One suggestion was that they had decided to go for Mirages since the French had renewed their earlier offer. We view this with some scepticism. Again, it may be that they will in the end go for Migs and it does seem that there are elements in the Iraqi establishment who would be happier about turning to the Russians for further equipment. Some officers (including perhaps a member of the Technical Committee involved) are apparently saying that in the event of war the British, unlike the Russians, could not be relied on to supply spares. Others, it seems, argue that maintenance would be complicated by the introduction of equipment from more than one country. There are, of course, counter arguments, particularly the inadvisability of placing all eggs in one basket and the need to balance foreign influence. Much, of course, will depend on Takriti's position inside the régime.



/4.

A.R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

*copied to Higgs  
BOT 2/2/69*

CONFIDENTIAL





CONFIDENTIAL

4. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating and if Abadi's assessment is right Takriti should be asking Brown to come out in the fairly near future. However, Takriti himself has only just returned from visits to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and it may in any case be a little time before he is ready to call for Brown to come. Takriti did not, as you know, see Brown on this last visit. This may have been because there were rumours in Baghdad that Brown had been indiscreet in London about how he could "fix" the Lightning deal. These might have been embarrassing to Takriti and would account for his wishing to be assured by his Staff Officers that the Lightning proposal was signed on technical grounds. The present régime are violently against any form of corruption and Takriti would obviously have to show that his nose was completely clean.

5. As regards the training aspect, we entirely agree with you about this. However, there is little that we can do about this at this stage unless and until the Iraqis do go firm on the Lightnings. The most that we could arrange would be for the Ambassador, if a suitable opportunity arose, to mention the training aspect in the most general terms to Takriti.

6. I am sending you two copies of this letter which you may wish to pass to the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Technology.

*Yours Ever*

*Donald Hawley*

(D.F. Hawley)

CONFIDENTIAL



9 November 1968

CONFIDENTIALLightnings for Iraq ,

Donald Makinson in his letter NEQ of 28 October 1968 asks for our views on Brown's optimistic accounts of his dealings in Baghdad. I can confirm that he maintained close touch with us here and he saw either Geoffrey Hancock or myself on many occasions, keeping us fully informed of the progress of his negotiations. He also called on the Ambassador, more than once in fact.

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/4.

A.R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

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(D.F. Hawley)

CONFIDENTIAL



By Bag

CONFIDENTIAL  
SAVING TELEGRAM

*COPY Do not reg.*

TRIPOLI TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 10 Saving 7 November, 1968

*NAL 3/6*

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to FOREIGN OFFICE Saving telegram no. 10 of  
7 November, 1968. Copies to:-

Washington	CBFNE
Bagdad	Amman
Bahrain	Kuwait
Tehran	Paris
Benghazi	

When I called on Libyan Prime Minister today, 7 November, he gave me details of the unexpected visit on 28 October of the Iraqi delegation. Sayyid Wanis Qadafi said that the Iraqi Vice-President, General Hamash, the Minister of Education and the Head of the Iraqi Arab Affairs Bureau, had arrived wholly unannounced at Baida airport and had thereupon had to be redirected to Tripoli where he and the government had moved.

2. The Iraqis had explained that while they had enough armament to look after their own frontiers, their new widened responsibilities in Syria and Jordan and against Israel had rendered necessary the purchase of 50 Mistère aircraft. These would cost £80 million and with spares a total of £100 million. They would like Libya to contribute either cash or to purchase some of the aircraft and make them available.

*Salih Mehdi Hamash*

3. General Hamash had then gone on to say that Iraq would also have further to expand her forces, particularly her navy, which at present was only equipped for coastal work, to balance Iranian naval power in the Arabian Gulf after British withdrawal in 1971. He had however given no details of plans or finance required for this purpose.

4. Sd. Wanis Qadafi had explained to the Iraqis that Libya had had her oil revenues for only five years, had an immense amount to do to equip and arm herself, and had not even been able to build up a reserve fund. It was therefore out of the question to contribute to the Iraqi armed forces.

5. The Iraqis had then gone on to ask for Libya's help in dealing with Iran over frontier problems and in connection with the Kurds. Sd. Wanis Qadafi had said that unfortunately their relations with Iran were not such as to make it possible for them usefully to intervene. He suggested Turkey as an intermediary. The Iraqis had countered by expressing a wish for the help of an Arab state. The Libyans declined.

6. Finally the Iraqis had asked Libya's help in view of her good relations with the United States, to bring pressure to bear on the United States Government to help forward a solution of the Israeli problem. This Sd. Qadafi felt able to agree to.

Sir R. Sarell

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Defence Training & Supply Dept.	

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CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 431

TO BAGHDAD

19 NOVEMBER 1968

(NE)

13

TOP SECRET

12

CONFIDENTIAL.

HAWLEY'S LETTER TO MOORE 10/3 OF 9 NOVEMBER: LIGHTNINGS.

BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY THAT PROSPECTS OF SELLING LIGHTNINGS WOULD BE IMPROVED IF AN R A F LIGHTNING COULD BE DEMONSTRATED IN IRAQ TO SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. IF WE SAW NO OBJECTION TO THE IDEA, THEY WOULD PUT IT TO THE IRAQIS, SUGGESTING THAT THE LATTER SHOULD ASK US TO MAKE AN AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE.

2. WE HAVE HEARD FROM THE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY THAT THE COMPANY HAVE NOW MADE A FIRM OFFER OF 40 AIRCRAFT, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE APPROVAL OF AN EXPORT LICENSE. ON THIS, OUR OWN POSITION OF COURSE REMAINS THAT THE DECISION TO GRANT OR REFUSE A LICENSE WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING AT THE TIME IT WAS APPLIED FOR.

3. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON THE COMPANY'S SUGGESTION ABOUT AN R A F AIRCRAFT BY TELEGRAM.

STEWART

FILES  
NEAR EASTERN DEPT.  
D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret  
Secret  
~~Confidential~~  
Restricted  
Unclassified

Flash  
Immediate }  
Priority  
Routine

(Date)

Dispatched

**CYPHER**

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

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Code  
Cypher

[Security classification  
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

BAGHDAD

Draft Telegram to:—

No. Baghda 431

(Date) 19/11

And to:—

Addressed to

telegram No.

(date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

Files  
N.E. Dept.  
D.T.S. Dept.

Copies to:—

Hawley's letter to Moore 10/3 of 9 November:  
Lightnings.

British Aircraft Corporation have suggested to the Ministry of Technology that prospects of selling Lightnings would be improved if an RAF Lightning could be demonstrated in Iraq to senior members of the Government. If we saw no objection to the idea, they would put it to the Iraqis, suggesting that the latter should ask us to make an aircraft available.

2. We have heard from the Ministry of Technology that the company have now made a firm offer of 40 aircraft, subject only to the approval of an export license. On this, our own position of course remains that the decision to grant or refuse a license would have to be taken in the light of all the circumstances

/prevailing

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.15  
21 NOV 1958

19/11  
1807/19/112



prevailing at the time it was applied for.

3. Grateful for your views on the company's suggestion about an RAF aircraft by telegram.

R.E. 19/11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



CONFIDENTIAL

## MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

14

EIR.2b2,  
Room 530,Castlewood House,  
77-91 New Oxford Street,  
LONDON, W.C.1.

Ext. 860

Our reference: HU/151/010  
Your reference:14<sup>12</sup> November 1968

Entered NEQ 10/3

Copy to →

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 21 Nov 1968 NEQ 10/1
---

Dear

Discussions have been taking place between BAC, HSD and the Iraqi Air Force on the possible sale of Lightning aircraft equipped with Red Top air to air missiles. The total value of the order would be £70M and the Red Top content would amount to approximately £4M. Release of Column 3 Confidential information was agreed (C - Form GW(C) 46/S179).

It is understood that BAC have quoted to the Iraqis for Lightning aircraft and 20 Red Top packs involving 100 plus missiles.

I would therefore be grateful for the agreement of Air Force Department to the supply of Red Top to Iraq. I am copying this letter to Mr. C. A. Alldis MOD(N) and Mr. D. Murray DSS(FCO) for their agreement and to other members of the AWP for information. An early reply would be appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

(MISS J. PIKE)

Mr. J. T. Cliffe,  
DS.8,  
Ministry of Defence (Air Force Department)  
Room 523B,  
Main Building,  
Whitehall, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) Reg.  
(2) DM  
(3) Mr. Evans.  
Postman  
Nac  
Jerrit

Grateful  
for early  
visit  
2060 12/11/68  
Jerrit  
25/11



Mr. M. H. Tallboys,  
Ministry of Defence,  
Head of DS.13,  
Main Building,

Mr. O. J. Porter;  
MOD(Central Staffs);  
DS.13(c),  
Main Building,

Mr. R. W. Browne,  
Ministry of Defence Army Department,  
Sales 5,  
St. Christopher House,  
S.E.1.

Mr. R. E. Adams;  
Treasury,  
S.W.1.

Mr. J. Doyle,  
Department of Economic Affairs,  
Overseas and General Division,  
73/A Ground,  
Stoney's Gate,  
S.W.1.

Mr. J. Coates,  
EIR.2c,

Mr. L. Savigar  
EIR.1(c)

Mr. D. Church,  
Board of Trade,  
1-19 Victoria Street,  
S.W.1.

Miss J. E. Stevens,  
Board of Trade,  
Hillgate House,  
35 Old Bailey,  
E.C.4.

Secretariat  
Mr. G. Warman,  
DS.13(c),  
Main Building.



CONFIDENTIAL

15

Near Eastern Department,

22 November, 1968.

REQ 10/1

I am sorry we have been some time in letting you have the reply to your letter AP/77/05 of 23 October. I now enclose a copy of Donald Hawley's letter, which answers both your earlier query and your later letter of the same reference of 15 November. — (11)

2. I agree with your comment on paragraph 3 of Hawley's letter, that we continued to supply spares during the break in relations, and that this point might well be made to the Iraqis.

(D. J. Makinson)

C. B. Benjamin, Esq.,  
EIR. 1(a),  
Ministry of Technology,  
Castlewood House.

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No. *NEP 10/1*

DRAFT

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
~~Secret~~  
Confidential. ✓  
~~Restricted~~  
~~Unclassified~~

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

*C. B. Benjamin Esq*

*EIR. 1(a)*

*Ministry of Technology*

*Castlewood House*

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

*NEP*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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2. I agree with your comment on para 3 of Hawley's letter, that we continued to supply spares during the break in relations, & that this might well be made to the Iraqis.

*21/11*



NEQ 10/11

(16)

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

UPHER/CAT A  
ROUTINE BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 439

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
21 NOVEMBER 1968. *manila & letter*

CONFIDENTIAL

(13)

*P. J. 28/11*

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 431: LIGHTNINGS.

ONE POSSIBLE OBJECTION IS THAT DAMAGE WHICH WOULD BE DONE TO ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS IF AN EXPORT LICENCE WERE EVENTUALLY REFUSED WOULD BE INCREASED IF IRAQIS FELT THAT BY PROVIDING A DEMONSTRATION BY AN R.A.F. AIRCRAFT WE HAD MISLED THEM INTO THINKING THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO SUPPLY. PROVIDED IT IS MADE CLEAR THAT DEMONSTRATION IS QUOTE WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNQUOTE I SEE CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IN PROPOSAL. //

2. TIME IS HOWEVER SHORT. OFFICER COMMANDING IRAQI AIRFORCE TOLD MY D.A. YESTERDAY THAT A DECISION ON BAC OFFER COULD BE EXPECTED WITHIN THREE WEEKS.

3. ARE BAC AWARE OF IRAQIS APPARENT RENEWED INTEREST IN FRENCH AIRCRAFT (TRIPOLI TELNO 10 SAVING OF 7 NOVEMBER)?

4. IF PROPOSAL GOES FORWARD YOU MAY WISH TO INFORM IRANIANS AND KUWAITIS BEFORE DEMONSTRATION TAKES PLACE.

MR. EVANS

FILES

NEAR EASTERN DEPT.  
D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL



(NEQ.10/1)

22 November, 1968.

**CONFIDENTIAL****Demonstration of RAF Lightnings in Iraq**

I am sorry to have been so long in replying to your letter of 8 November, but we have had to consult several departments, and our Embassy in Baghdad.

2. Although there are, as you say, political risks involved in such an operation, we do not think these are sufficiently serious to justify us withholding agreement. There are two points, however, to which we attach importance. The first is that we do not want to raise false hopes, and it is important that BAC should make it clear that the demonstrations, as indeed all the negotiations, do not commit H.M.G. or presuppose agreement to supply the aircraft.

3. Secondly, we would wish to be told in advance if the demonstration is to take place, so that we could instruct our Embassies in neighbouring countries to inform beforehand the governments to which they are accredited.

(D.J. Hakinson)

J.P. Sheen Esq.,  
EIR.1(a),  
Ministry of Technology,  
Castlewood House.

Copy to: G. Whitmore Esq., D.S.S(a), Ministry of Defense.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

W(D) 51-7433

Registry No. NEQ.10/1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Type final.  
DRAFT ~~letter~~ ~~letter~~

Type 1 +

To:-

~~Mr Evans~~

~~Mr House~~

Mr J. P. Sheen, Esq.

EIR. 1(a)

Ministry of

Technology,

Castlewood House.

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

NEQ

C. Whitmore  
Esq

D. S. 8(a)

MOD.

Demonstration of RAF Lightning  
in Iraq.

I am sorry to have been  
so long in replying to your  
letter of 8th November, but  
~~as~~ we have had to  
consult several departments,  
& our Embassy in Baghdad.

Although these are, as  
you say, political risks  
involved in such an operation,  
we do not think there are  
sufficiently serious to justify  
~~our~~ us withholding ~~an~~  
agreement. The Ambassador  
has There are two points,  
however to which we attach  
importance. The first is  
that we do not want to  
raise false hopes, & it is  
important that BAC  
should make it clear that  
the demonstrations, as indeed  
all the negotiations, do not



Commit HMA or presuppose  
agreement to supply the  
aircraft.

Secondly, we would wish  
~~to~~ to be held in advance,  
~~so that~~ if the demonstration  
is to take place, <sup>so that we</sup> ~~we should~~  
inform could instruct our  
embassies in neighboring  
countries to inform <sup>beforehand</sup> the  
governments to which they  
are accredited.

Am  
22/11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1  
Telephone: ~~Whitehall 022 2000~~

18

Our reference: D/DS8/27/  
reference:

ARCHIVES No. 15

22 NOV 1968

NEA 10/11

01-930 7022 Ext. 6214

*This has been overtaken by another letter, which is on its way, so Mr Whitmore tells me.*  
21<sup>st</sup> November 1968

*Reg & p.a.*  
*Don 27/11*

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter of 8th November to Makinson about the demonstration of a Cyprus-based RAF Lightning in Iraq.

2. Notwithstanding your third paragraph I thought that I would examine BAC's proposal with the Air Staff now. I am afraid that I must tell you at once that we should not find it at all easy to make a Lightning available. There is only one Lightning squadron in Cyprus and it is already under considerable pressure in carrying out its operational commitments; so much so that NEAF are having difficulty in making aircraft available for essential modification programmes. Even a short detachment of a week, which is the sort of period the aircraft would be away from its base, would increase this pressure and reduce the operational capability of the squadron.
3. I ought also to mention that it has been suggested here that to allow for unserviceability we should think of sending not one Lightning but two, since one unserviceable Lightning in Baghdad might well be worse than no demonstration at all. But this would of course be even more unacceptable operationally.
4. We should also have problems about finding tanker capacity to support a Lightning flight from Cyprus to Baghdad and back in the near future. As you know, after the delivery of two Lightnings to Kuwait on 13th December we are not planning any more deliveries to either Kuwait or Saudi Arabia before mid-March; and this is because all available tanker capacity is earmarked for other purposes. We could therefore provide tanker support for a demonstration in Iraq only at the expense of some other commitment.
5. One other problem which has been mentioned to me is that if a Lightning did go to Baghdad, it would be a fully operational one. We should have to explore whether there were parts of the aircraft we should not want the Iraqis to see. There would also be the question of guarding the aircraft when it was not being demonstrated.

/5.

J. P. Sheen Esq.  
EIR 1(a)  
Ministry of Technology  
Castlewood House  
New Oxford Street  
London W.C.1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

5. I am sorry to have to produce a catalogue of objections but I thought you should know now rather than later that if you do put BAC's proposal to us formally we are not going to find it easy to agree to. But we are well aware that there may be a large export order at stake here and if in your judgement and that of our Embassy in Baghdad the appearance of a Lightning in Baghdad was a critical factor in securing the order we would be prepared to ask VCAS whether, notwithstanding the detriment to the operational capability of the Cyprus squadron, he would agree to a demonstration by an RAF Lightning in Iraq.

6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Makinson in the FCO.

C. A. WHITMORE

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to: DD Ops(P)(RAF)  
DD Ops(DS)(RAF)  
F6t(Air)



CONFIDENTIAL


CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH

TELEGRAM NUMBER 473

30 NOVEMBER 1968



CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 473 OF 30 NOVEMBER RE-  
EATED FOR INFORMATION TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY AND BOARD  
OF TRADE.

NK

*Discussed with hi have  
& hi Arthur. New pa.*  
**TOP COPY**

MY TELEGRAM STOW 9: LIGHTNINGS.

A MEMBER OF MY STAFF SAW ABADI THIS MORNING. ABADI  
SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM A MEMBER OF REGIONAL COMMAND  
OF BAATH PARTY THAT THEY WERE SENDING FOUR PEOPLE TO LONDON,  
THREE OF THEM MILITARY AND ONE CIVILIAN, ALL CONNECTED  
WITH PARTY. THEY WOULD BE TRAVELLING BY SEPARATE ROUTES  
ONE VIA EAST GERMANY AND ANOTHER VIA LIBYA, AND  
WOULD BE CONTACTING BAC DIRECT ON ARRIVAL WITHOUT INFORMING  
IRAQI EMBASSY. HE DID NOT KNOW THEIR NAMES.  
REGIONAL COMMAND WERE STILL VERY  
INTERESTED IN PURCHASE OF LIGHTNINGS AND APPEARED TO HAVE  
TAKEN OVER RUNNING FROM TAKRITI. THERE WAS STILL A SHORTAGE  
OF MONEY AND BAC SHOULD BE AS FLEXIBLE AS POSSIBLE IN NEGOT-  
IATION IN VIEW OF SUBSTANTIAL DEFENCE ORDERS WHICH WOULD FOLLOW  
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF LIGHTNING CONTRACT.

2. ABADI REQUESTED THAT BROWN SHOULD BE INFORMED  
OF ABOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. VISIT REFERRED TO ABOVE MAY WELL BE LINKED WITH THAT  
REFERRED TO IN MY TELEGRAM NO CRED A 47. — NR 29/11

NK 30/11

4. EVIDENCE FROM OTHER SOURCES I, E. THAT CONTAINED  
IN MY TELEGRAM NO CRED A 49 SUGGESTS THAT INCREASED ROLE  
BEING PLAYED BY PARTY IN THIS DEAL DOES NOT MEAN THAT PARTY  
HAS COMPLETELY TAKEN OVER RUNNING FROM TAKRITI. HE STILL  
REMAINS KEY FIGURE.

*below*

FCO PASS MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY AND CRED A BOARD OF TRADE.

MR. EVANS

/COPIES SENT TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY (CASTLEWOOD) AND B/TRADE/

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DEF. POL. DEPT.

MIL. ADV.

P.U.S.D.

A.M. & T.D.

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO BOARD OF TRADE

TELEGRAM NUMBER CREDA 49

30 NOVEMBER, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING IMMEDIATELY TO STEADMAN CHELMSFORD  
4693 FROM HARDING.

TIKRITIS MAN TOOK ME TO SEE GENERAL THIS MORNING.

TIKRITI SAID THAT OUR PRICE WAS ~~WAS~~ HIGH  
AND RUSSIAN PRICE WAS £50,000 BELOW OURS. I TOLD HIM  
THAT OUR PRICE AND DELIVERY WAS NOW FINAL AND NO  
LONGER NEGOTIABLE. HE HAD NOT SEEN REPORT OF TECHNICAL

~~0.85533, 0.499~~

CH

COMMITTEE AND AGREED TO CALL FOR IT, BUT SAID

IT WAS HE WHO HAD INSISTED ON COMPARISONS WITH ARMY

AND U.A.C. PRICES. HE URGED ME NOT TO LEAVE

COUNTRY AND IMPLIED HE WOULD MAKE A FINAL DECISION BEFORE

HE HIMSELF LEFT ON TUESDAY 3 DECEMBER.

2. HE ASKED WHAT OTHER PROJECTS MARCONI MIGHT BE ABLE TO

UNDERTAKE FOR AIR FORCE. I MENTIONED TROPO SCHEME AND

HE PROMISED TO GIVE MARCONI AND I INFORMATION



EXTRACT FROM

F.C.O. SERIES

17

FOLDER

887

(CLOSED UNTIL

2010

released

folio w/19 min

PROCESSED  
PUT IN PLACE

13 FEB 2001



HE ALSO MENTIONED RADAR AND SAID THAT MARCONI WOULD BE  
ASKED TO SUBMIT AN EXCLUSIVE TENDER FOR THIS, IN  
DUE COURSE.

3. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE PREFERED TO DEAL WITH GROUP

~~95234 SE, ?~~

→ (OTHER THAN B.A.C.) THROUGH MARCONI AS THIS CHANNEL

~~EL~~ HAD NOW BEEN ESTABLISHED. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ON  
GROUNDS OF SECURITY. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE HOPED TO DO

A GREAT DEAL OF BUSINESS WITH BRITAIN ~~IN FUTURE. EEEEE~~

→ IN FUTURE AND SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT BUSINESS GROUP  
HAD DONE IN SAUDI ARABIA AND LIBYA. I GAVE HIM GENERAL  
DETAILS.

4. TIKRITI'S MAN HAS NOW MADE IT PLAIN THAT GENERAL  
INSISTS ON £30,000 MINIMUM AS COMMISSION FOR PARTY FUNDS.  
WITHOUT IT ~~T~~AKRITI WILL NOT SIGN.

5. PLEASE CONSIDER THIS REQUEST AGAINST BACKGROUND  
OF FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS AND TELEPHONE YOUR AGREEMENT.

EVANS

SENT AT 1325Z/30 NOVEMBER

RECD AT 1421Z/30 NOVEMBER



CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

NEQ/10/1

20

Mr. Evans

R.E. 25/11.

Mr. Moore

Mr. Davidson (Defence Training & Supply Dept.)

Mr. Murray (Defence Training & Supply Dept.)

Lightnings for Iraq

We have had reservations, on political grounds, about the ability of General Hardan Takriti to push through the Lightning deal. (It is interesting to note that C.F.P. and I.P.C. have similar reservations - see Commodities and Oil Department's telegram 439 of 20 Nov). The Ministry of Technology echo these reservations. Mr. Ian Brown of B.A.C. is more optimistic.

2. The Ministry of Technology therefore asked us to seek the views of the Embassy (their letter of 23 October at f.2). Since then we have received a further letter from the Ministry of Technology, asking substantially the same question, though in the added context of Lightning training.

3. I have now sent Mr. Benjamin of the Ministry of Technology a copy of Mr. Hawley's letter (f.12) with a covering letter. (f.15).

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.15

2000 1968

NEQ 10/1

*D. J. Makinson*

(D. J. Makinson)  
Near Eastern Dept.  
Room W133  
Tel: MB 1163  
22 November, 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL



Registry No.  
DEPARTMENT C. & O.D.

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s) \_\_\_\_\_

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

JTF  
21/11

Flash  
Immediate  
Priority  
Routine

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

Despatched \_\_\_\_\_

*Mr Malleson*  
*NED*

PRIVACY MARKING

*In Confidence*

*En Clair.*  
*Code*  
*Cypher*

[Security classification  
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. \_\_\_\_\_ (date) \_\_\_\_\_

And to \_\_\_\_\_

repeated for information to \_\_\_\_\_

Saving to ~~BEIRUT~~ ~~THE HAGUE~~ PARIS TEHRAN WASHINGTON

My telegram No. 430 [19 November]: Iraq Oil.

Following their informal consultations over the last few weeks the Iraq Petroleum Company Groups have now reached a consensus on the line to be taken with the Iraqi régime.

2. The broad aim is an overall settlement. But first of all soundings are to be made by the IPC's Baghdad representatives of the attitudes of key people in the Party/Government complex. Some names that have been mentioned by IPC sources are Sheikhly (Foreign Minister), Saddam Takriti (Regional Secretary-General of the Party), Ammash (Minister of the Interior) as well as General Hardan Takriti himself, who some members of IPC consider to be of lower standing than the other three. in the party (This is, of course, a different matter from any assessment which might be made of Hardan Takriti's standing in the country

/generally.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD

No. 439

(Date) \_\_\_\_\_

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—  
~~BEIRUT~~  
~~THE HAGUE~~  
PARIS  
TEHRAN  
WASHINGTON

Distribution:—  
Departmental  
C. & O. Dept.  
NED  
Research Dept.  
IRD

Copies to:—

A.T. Gregory,  
Min of Power.  
F.P.B. Derrick,  
Treasury.  
R.I. Hallows,  
Bank of England.



generally.) The aim of these soundings will be to determine whether the present effective rulers of Iraq are seriously prepared to reach an overall settlement in stages. The first stage would be as rapid a negotiation as possible of a list of principles or Heads of Agreement, 'ratification' of which by the Iraq Government would be matched by the IPC with an immediate downpayment of, say, £25 million. (This would leave <sup>perhaps</sup> £40 to 50 million for the IPC still to play with.)

The IPC's idea is to approach such a settlement

3. The next stage would be a ~~quick~~ start to practical implementation of the Heads of Agreement (e.g. resumed exploration and oilfield development) concurrent with negotiation of detailed texts elaborating the Heads of Agreement. The IPC recognise that this latter process would almost certainly lead to a lot of difficult bargaining, ~~and bickering~~, but feel that this would be well worth facing once the key breakthrough had been achieved in the shape of a settlement in principle and of resumed growth of IPC activity in 'more normal' conditions. Further lump-sum payments would be made on the basis of satisfactory progress in the detailed negotiation.

4. In the course of the preliminary soundings of key men it is apparently not (repeat not) intended that the shape of a possible overall settlement should be mooted by the IPC side in any detail. If the result of the soundings is <sup>broadly</sup> favourable, the intention is to strike whilst the iron is hot by sending out a small team (probably Sutcliffe and MacDonald again) with a view to rapid negotiation of Heads of Agreement. On present form the team would arrive in early December.

/If

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If the result of the soundings is unfavourable, the team would still come out, but with the more limited aim of seeking piecemeal agreement(s) linked to smaller lump-sum payment(s). There are a number of quite important issues which the IPC could seek to clear up in this way. They largely cover questions of operating boundaries, ~~affected by the Iraqis' expropriatory legislation.~~

Cases in point are a number of promising structures in the North and a known extension of the Ain Zalah field, all at present in the territory which the Iraqis purport to have taken over under *their expropriatory* ~~that~~ legislation. Ain Zalah could be a ~~particular~~ *particularly* useful test case since it provides something of a parallel to North Rumaila without the symbolic overtones of the latter.

~~5. The preliminary soundings may not produce a sufficiently clearcut result one way or the other, in which case the visiting team may have to make further soundings before entering into negotiation proper.~~

6. As set out, the above could misleadingly suggest that a plan of campaign has been worked out in every detail. In fact there are a number of contingencies which cannot be adequately provided for in advance, but it is hoped that the persons ~~to be~~ engaged in the sounding operations and the eventual negotiations will be allowed reasonable discretion. The whole process will obviously call for delicate handling and difficult decisions, at various stages, but the general line demonstrates a seriousness and

/flexibility

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flexibility of approach by IPC which promises well if the Iraqi side shows real signs of willingness and ability to settle matters across the board.

Even assuming such an Iraqi attitude, the question of the durability of a settlement remains, but the IPC's ideas have a degree of insurance built into them through the proposed staggering of payments 'by results'.

6. On the general issues of the negotiability and durability of an overall settlement Danner of CFP has ~~commented privately on the following lines:~~

(i) The present Iraqi regime <sup>is</sup> ~~consists of~~ a gang of fascist-type thugs who seem determined to defend their acquired positions by suppressing any opposition with utter ruthlessness, <sup>Consequently</sup> ~~and, therefore,~~ however morally distasteful dealing with them might be, they may be just the sort of people to show the will and capacity to reach an <sup>overall</sup> ~~settlement of this intractable dispute~~ and to impose it politically.

(ii) <sup>As</sup> ~~As~~ regards the durability of the régime and, ~~with it,~~ the stability of any settlement, anyone knowing Iraq would be stupid to be ~~ever~~sanguine, but if the IPC can reach the stage of resuming something like 'business as usual', there might be some hope that a successor régime would not wish to upset things completely once again and thereby to sap the financial base for its own viability.

7. The above information is not necessarily complete. It has been obtained, indeed almost extracted, on the basis of close personal confidence. The

in the following private comments throw light on some of the thinking behind the IPC approach:-

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CONFIDENTIAL

IPC <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ understandably anxious that there should be no leak of any kind. You and other recipients are therefore asked to treat all the above as strictly for your own information only. If, as is likely, Hahn should take you into his confidence, you should not reveal our detailed knowledge and should confine yourself to saying that you had heard from us only in very general terms to the effect that some further sounding of the ground was to be carried out prior to an ~~early~~ early visit by a negotiating team.

U

21/11

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CONFIDENTIAL



in Alston,  
in Beamish.  
~~in Evans.~~  
~~Mr. Moore~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 6

Demonstration in Iraq by RAF Lightnings:  
MinTech letter of 8 November

The presence of (probably) two RAF Lightnings in RAF Colours in Baghdad would be likely -

- (a) to give rise to complaints from the Israelis over arms supplies to the Arabs;
- (b) to be used as arguments, however disingenuous, by the Israelis that we were actively involved in Iraq;
- (c) to provide an argument which the Shah could, however, hypocritically use tactically when discussing penetration by "revolutionary regimes" in the Gulf;
- (d) to be misrepresented in Syria and possibly in Iraq.

*Shalinton*  
12.11.68.  
(RETYPE).

Separate minute.



Letter to Bag...

Mr. Matkinson. R.E.

in the line

19/11

I cannot, but I am not  
sure that I would attach  
very great weight to  
points (a) & (b) in the  
argument.

RJA (R.J. ALSTON)  
13/11

I am not persuaded by point (c)  
though I agree that the Shah might not  
welcome a demonstration on the lines envisaged.  
He would find it difficult to understand why  
we were apparently "pursuing" the matter.

NE. Div. Pl Submit with  
Mr Evans telegram.

13  
Jm 20/11

K

Mr Evans R.E. 25/11.

~~Mr Evans~~

Arabian Dept, Mr Ibbott.

OTSD, Mr Davidson.

Please now see my

letter



All refs  
red flags.  
Flag E

letter to Mr Sheen at f. 9.  
in reply to his of 8<sup>th</sup> Nov,  
proposing that RAF Lightnings  
should be used for a sales  
demonstration in Iraq.

Flag G

In his telegram of 16  
21 November ~~at~~ Mr Trevor Evans  
raises two points:

(a) the demonstration should  
be made, as indeed are all  
negotiations, without commitment  
to HM's agreement to supply:

(b) the Iraqis are still  
talking about French aircraft,  
(see Tripoli Savings 10 of 7 Nov),  
although either Gen Ammash was  
mistaken, and said Mystere  
when he meant Mirage (the  
competitor to Lightning); or he  
was right, & the Iraqis are also  
thinking of buying strike aircraft.

Flag F

why  
after ②

It is in any case evidence of  
further polarisation in the Cabinet:  
Tahariti favouring British aircraft,  
& the Ba'ath Party favouring French.

J. H. M. Linton  
22. 11. 68

Pa. Jm 28/11



21

SL/AIR 37625/27

29th November, 1968.

EQ 10/3 (134)

EQ 10/3 (135)

Military Aircraft for Iraq

Please refer to my letter of 17th September, your reply of 24th, and F.C.O. letter of 26th September about the sale of Lightning Aircraft to Iraq.

2. We have indicated to B.A.C. that we would consider an application for a Buyer Credit Facility for up to 70% of the contract price, with repayment half-yearly over 5 years. We have emphasised that this intimation contains no assurance about export licences and that any drawings from a loan, if arranged, could not be made before an export licence has been granted.

3. Since then we have been trying to establish the terms which CoFACE are prepared to cover. From their answers it is not absolutely clear but we interpret the situation as being that they would accept terms of 5 years from last delivery, equivalent to 5 years 9 months from mean delivery. Although this does not entirely square with other assertions about the risk period, this evidence seems to us sufficiently firm to justify our matching these credit terms.


4. B.A.C. have also alleged that 80% of the French price would be on credit. There is however no evidence that we need increase the loan proportion above the 70% of the price that we have said we would accept, and I propose to tell B.A.C. that this is the case. I should be grateful if Graham at F.C.O. can add anything to what he said on 26th September about political approval for this sale. Although I would wish to tell B.A.C. of our willingness to cover the longer terms described above (if you agree) there is the problem in discussing detail with B.A.C. that they will overlook the major issues still to be settled before cover can be offered. The sooner, therefore, we can establish that the business is acceptable to H.M.G. the better.

5. I am copying to Hewertson (Defence), Airey (Technology), Graham (F.C.O.), Davies (Board of Trade), Ryan (Bank of England) and Rawlings here.

E. C. Lucas, Esq.,  
H. M. Treasury,  
Great George Street,  
London, S.W.1.

(K. W. Cotterill)





Treasury Chambers  
Great George Street, London, S.W.1  
Telephone: Whitehall 1234, ext. 288.

4th December, 1968.

Our Reference: 2F376/58/01  
Your Reference: SL/AIR 37625/27.

Near Eastern  
Dept.  
Mr. Harrison

Military Aircraft for Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 29th November about the British Aircraft Corporation's bid to sell Lightnings to Iraq.

We have no objection to your matching French terms that amount to less than 6 years true credit if that is what the evidence justifies.

Graham will know that we suggested last September that some attempt should be made to forecast the probability of the export being licensed or not. This is now urgent as it would, I imagine, be most embarrassing to have to withhold a license after B.A.C. had made an offer that had been accepted by the Iraqis. I hope that the F.O. will now feel able to express at least a provisional view.

I am copying this to Nicholls here and to Graham, Hewertson, Davies, Rawlings, Airey and Ryan.

Yours sincerely,

(C.C. Lucas)

K.W. Cotterill, Esq.,  
Export Credits Guarantee Department,  
P.O. Box 272,  
Barrington House,  
59/67, Gresham Street,  
E.C.2.







*M. M. M. M. M.*

*Neary  
Fahm  
Dep't.*

**With the Compliments of**



*Adyan H. draft*

RECEIVED IN
K. W. ARCHIVES No. 13
27 DEC 1968
NEQ 10/1
EXPORT CREDITS

**GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT**

**P.O. BOX No. 272  
BARRINGTON HOUSE  
59-67, GRESHAM STREET  
LONDON, E.C.2.**

*draft* **(23)**

*19/12*



RESTRICTED

23



Export Promotion Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

11 December, 1968.

(NEQ 10/1)

21

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Lucas SL/ALR 37625/27 of 29 November. In paragraph 4 of that letter you ask if I can add anything to what we said on 26 September about political approval for the sale. We are tied by the ruling of the Cabinet Paper on arms sales, that we can only consider whether or not we would approve an export licence when and if a request to purchase is made by a foreign government.

2. It seems to me however that this need not affect the issue of cover, since if we thought a sale was politically desirable and were prepared to agree to an export licence, we would on political grounds support the application for cover.

22

3. Since drafting the preceding paragraphs I have seen Lucas' reply 2F 376/58/d of 4 December to your letter. I think, however, that his question is answered above: we cannot at the same time agree to sales enquiries proceeding without commitment to supply, and then subsequently use the risk of embarrassment as an argument to supply. Either we must be in a position to rule on the original sales proposals, or when a request to purchase is made. In accordance with the current Cabinet ruling we follow the latter practice, of which BAC is well aware, and which is made a condition of every quotation.

4. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

(P. D. Graham)

K. W. Cotterill, Esq.,  
Export Credits Guarantee Department,  
P.O. Box 272,  
Barrington House,  
59/67, Gresham Street,  
E.C.2.

RESTRICTED



Registry No. *NEP 10/1*

DRAFT letter

Type 1 + 9

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

K. W. Cotterill, Esq.,  
E.C.G.D.

*Export Credits Guarantee  
Dept.*

From  
P. D. Graham,  
Export Commercial Dept.  
*Promotion*  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Thank you for sending me a copy of your letter to Lucas SL/ALR 37625/27 of 29 November.

In paragraph 4 of that letter you ask if I can add anything to what we said on 26 September about political approval <sup>for</sup> of the sale. We are tied by the ruling of the Cabinet paper on arms sales, that we can only consider whether or not we would approve an export license when and if a request to purchase is made by a foreign government.

2. It seems to me however that this need not affect the issue of cover, since if we thought a sale was politically desirable and were prepared to agree to an export license, we would on political grounds support the application for cover.

4. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

C.D.  
R 11 DEC 1968  
D.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

W(B)L 51-7433

f. 22

*Since drafting the preceding paragraphs I have seen Lucas's letter of 4<sup>th</sup> December to your letter. I think, however, that his*



question is answered above:  
we cannot at the same  
time agree to sales enquiries  
proceeding without commitment  
to supply, & then <sup>subsequently</sup> ~~later~~ <sup>then</sup> ~~later~~  
use the risk of embarrassment  
as an argument to supply.

Either we must be in a  
position to <sup>rule</sup> rule on the  
original sales proposals, or  
when a request to <sup>purchase</sup> purchase  
is made <sup>in accordance with the</sup> ~~that the~~ ~~the~~ ~~present~~ <sup>current</sup>  
Cabinet <sup>ruling</sup> ruling we follow the  
latter practice, of which BAC  
is well aware, & which  
is made a condition of every  
quotation.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

(24)

E.I.R.1(a),  
Room 404,

906.

AE/TU/05

13th December, 1961.

(21)

Military Aircraft for Iraq

You wrote to Lucas on 29th November about E.A.C.'s attempts to interest the Iraqis in the Lightning.

The precise status of E.A.C.'s proposal to supply lightnings to Iraq is still in doubt, and until we know that the Iraqis are prepared to negotiate, and the scale of their possible purchases we shall not have the material to make a realistic submission to Ministers, and there would be little point to us making yet another 'hypothetical' case, for our Minister of State received no opposition from his colleagues to his suggestion earlier this year (letter to Members of Strategic Exports Ministerial Committee dated 10.4.60) that, even in the absence of diplomatic relations, E.A.C. should continue to pursue this possible sale.

To understand from our Ambassador in Baghdad that some indication of how the Iraqis are going to respond should be forthcoming soon, and when we know that the sales prospect is a real one we shall clear a submission between Departments. Meanwhile, we should like E.A.C. to be cleared to keep abreast of the competition in the running up to the starting gate, otherwise they may never get there.

I am copying this to the recipients of your letter.

C. B. BENJAMIN

(C. B. Benjamin)

E. H. Cottrell, Esq.,  
Export Credits Guarantee Department,  
P.O. Box 272,  
Barrington House,  
29-37 Graham Street,  
LONDON, E.C.2.

**CONFIDENTIAL**



P. N. Graham Esq.,  
New Bedford  
Dec 23/12

With the Compliments of

W. Munnay  
C. B. BENJAMIN

(24).

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY IN

EIRI(a)

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TOP COPY

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY FROM BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NO 544

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

21 DECEMBER 1968

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 544 OF 21 DECEMBER

INFORMATION TO JEDDAH AND MINTECH.

LIGHTNINGS.

MY TELEGRAM NO STOW 13 (NOT TO ALL).

THE AIR FORCE APPEAR TO WANT LIGHTNINGS, DESPITE REPORTS WE HAVE HEARD TO THE CONTRARY, BUT MAY BE INHIBITED BY LACK OF MONEY.

THEY MAY HOPE THAT THE SAUDIS CAN BE PERSUADED TO FINANCE THE PURCHASE OF PART OF THEIR REQUIREMENT OR GRANT THEM A LOAN.

THEY MIGHT IN ANY CASE ASK THE SAUDIS TO RELEASE SOME AIRCRAFT NOW EARMARKED FOR THEM AGAINST SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT FROM THE IRAQI ORDER IF PLACED (MY TELEGRAM NO 385). (6)

2. THE SAUDIS MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN BEING FORTHCOMING IF, LIKE THE KUWAITIS, THEY WOULD PREFER TO SEE THE IRAQI AIR FORCE EQUIPPED WITH WESTERN RATHER THAN RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT. (KUWIAT TEL NO 460 OF 10 OCTOBER TO FCO). THERE WOULD BE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES FOR THE ARAB COUNTRIES GENERALLY, IF THE IRAQIS JOINED THOSE STATES EQUIPPED WITH LIGHTNINGS AND THEY MIGHT WISH TO OBLIGE TAKNITI, WHO CREATED A GOOD IMPRESSION IN JEDDAH (JEDDAH TEL NO 658 TO FCO OF 9 NOVEMBER). THERE ALREADY APPEARS TO BE A DEGREE OF TECHNICAL CONSULTATION. THE SAUDIS GAVE A FAVOURABLE SHOWING OF THE LIGHTNING TO THE IRAQIS IN NOVEMBER (STOW NO 8) AND MARCONIS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE IRAQIS ARE OBTAINING DETAILS FROM THE SAZDISC TOPOSPHERIC SCALTON EQUIPMENT.

3. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF H M AMBASSADOR IN JEDDAH COULD DISCOVER WHAT THE PRESENT SAUDI ATTITUDE IS TOWARD THE B.A.C. LIGHTNING DEAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS JEDDAH AND MINTECH.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO JEDDAH]

[COPIES PASSED TO MINTECH (CASTLEWOOD HOUSE)].

FILES

N. EAST DEPT.

N. AFR. DEPT.

ARAB DEPT.

DEF POL DEPT.

D.T. & S.D.

SCI & TECH DEPT.

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RECEIVED IN REPEATED FOR 5 30 DEC 1968 NEP 10/1.
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(25)  
NE  
P.A.  
30/12



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26

NE

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CYPHER/CAT A  
ROUTINE JEDDA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 723

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
29 DECEMBER 1968

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 30 DEC 1968 NEQ 10/1
---

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 723 OF 29 DECEMBER R F I TO BAGHDAD  
AND MINTECH

(25)  
BAGHDAD TELNO 544 TO FCO: LIGHTNINGS.

THE AIR ATTACHE IS VISITING RIYADH TOMORROW AND WILL SEE  
WHAT HE CAN PICK UP.

2. THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ADVANTAGE TO THE SAUDIS IF  
IRAQ BOUGHT LIGHTNINGS (A) THE LIGHTNING PRODUCTION LINE  
WOULD BE KEPT GOING FOR ANOTHER YEAR OR TWO AND THE SAUDIS  
WOULD ABE ABLE TO DELAY A DECISION ON ORDERING FURTHER AIRCRAFT  
(B) LIGHTNINGS ARRIVING HERE NOW ARE BEING PUT INTO DEEP  
STORAGE. THIS IS EXPENSIVE AND DIFFICULT AND IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY  
BE SENSIBLE IF IRAQ WERE TO BE SUPPLIED FROM CURRENT PRODUCTION  
(OR EVEN FROM AIRCRAFT ALREADY DELIVERED HERE) WHILE THE  
SAUDIS WAITED UNTIL THEY WERE PROPERLY TRAINED.

3. ONE CANNOT HOWEVER ASSUME THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE SO LOGICAL.  
AND ON PAST FORM IT IS AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT  
THEY WOULD PREFER TO STICK TO THE LETTER OF THEIR CONTRACT.  
IN ANY CASE I SHOULD GUESS THAT THEY WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO  
PROVIDE ANY FINANCIAL HELP. THIS WAS NOT EASILY ARRANGED EVEN  
FOR JORDAN, A REGIME TOWARDS WHICH SAUDI ATTITUDES ARE A  
GOOD DEAL MORE CLEAR CUT THAN TOWARDS IRAQ.

FCO PASS BAGHDAD AND MINTECH .

MR. CRAIG

[COPIES SENT TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY]  
[REPEATED TO BAGHDAD]

F I L E S  
N. EAST. D.  
N. AFR. D.  
ARABIAN D.  
DEF. POL. D.  
D.T.S.D.  
SCI. & TECH. D.

CONFIDENTIAL

pa. 81



CONFIDENTIAL

(27)

R.I.R.1(a),  
Room 404,

AP/139/055  
AP/TI/05

906.

30th December, 1968.

(25)

Lightnings for Iraq

In his telegram 544 of 21st December our Ambassador in Baghdad suggested that Jeddah might explore the Saudi attitude toward an Iraqi order for lightnings and the prospects of the latter in fact putting up money or allowing Iraq use of her aircraft.

From an industrial angle, the Iraq order is crucial to the future of the Lightning, since without it the production line will probably have to be closed. Apart from the employment, foreign exchange losses etc., this will be against the interests of the RAAF, since any future lightnings they need will have to come from ex-RAF aircraft being refurbished up to Mk. 53 or Mk. 55 standard. One would therefore like to see our people in Jeddah pointing up the arguments to bring this out.

...

As we discussed, I am attaching a draft telegram that you may consider sending to Jeddah. I am copying this letter to Donald Makinson (Eastern Dept.).

(G. R. Benjamin)

Copy: FCO - Mr. Makinson,  
Near Eastern Dept.

W. Fullerton, Esq.,



CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT TELEGRAM

To: JEDDA.

COPY FOR INFO TO: BAGHDAD.

Ref.: Tel. 544 (of 21 December) from Baghdad to FCO.

Subject: Lightnings.

1. In exploring Saudi attitude to an Iraqi order for Lightnings, apart from general political issues you could make the point that such an order will be in the interests of the RSAF (in securing the capacity to provide additional aircraft and less expensive spares as needed.)
2. For background, in the absence of a further order the Lightning production line will probably have to close shortly, which will mean that RSAF will not be able to acquire any "new" Mk. 53s or Mk. 55s, and the best that could be offered as replacements would be these Marks refurbished from RAF surplus aircraft. On present plans, deliveries from this source could not be expected until sometime in 1972 at earliest. On the other hand, with an Iraqi order proceeding through the production line, additional requirements for RSAF could be bled off relatively easily. Our particular anxiety is the relatively small number of Mk. 55s, for which replacements may be needed before any could be made available on refurbishment ex-RAF aircraft.
3. On spares, similarly, the continuation of production for all equipments over the three years that would be necessary to complete an order for 40 aircraft should make items less costly than would be the case if smaller numbers only for RSAF needs were being ordered.
4. A loan to Iraq 'tied' to helping to meet the cost of a Lightning order would, if the Saudis are considering financial support to the new regime, thus also provide added insurance for the RSAF's future needs. Needless to say, such an offer from Saudi would go a long way towards tipping the balance away from Russian proposals to supply MiGs at 'out-price' terms.

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CYPHER CAT A.

TOP COPY

(28)

ROUTINE JEDDA.

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.


TELEGRAM NO 8.

5 JANUARY 1969.

IVE

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 8 OF 5 JANUARY RFI TO BAGHDAD AND



(26)  
MY TELNO 723 LIGHTNINGS FOR IRAQ.

AIR ATTACHE DISCUSSED THIS WITH SOME RSAF OFFICERS ON  
31 DECEMBER (THE COMMANDER WAS ILL). ALL WELCOMED THE  
IDEA OF AN IRAQI PURCHASE ON THE GROUNDS BOTH OF POINT (A)  
IN MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE AND OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT  
ALLIES SHOULD HAVE UNIFORM EQUIPMENT. POINT (B) WAS  
NOT SO POPULAR, SOME OF THEM SAYING THAT A BIRD IN THE HAND  
WAS WORTH TWO IN THE BUSH.

FCO PASS BAGHDAD AND MINTECH.

MR. CRAIG

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY]

FILES

N. EAST. D.

N. AFRI. D.

ARABIAN DEPT.

DEF. POL. DEPT.

D.T.S.D.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

FFFFF



D. Makinson, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.  
F.C.O.

With the Compliments of ~~of~~ JAN 1969

C. B. Benjamin  
E.I.R.1(a)

NEQ 10/1

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

O

Reg. &  
submit to  
Mr. Makinson  
2/1



PRIORITY STOW 2 SENT 10.1.69

TO: BAGHDAD

FROM: KIR1(A) NINTECH

CONFIDENTIAL

29. E.L. - NED  
13/1.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 56 14 JAN 1969 NEQ 10/1
---

SUBJECT: B.A.C. AIRCRAFT SALES.

B.A.C. ARE SENDING ONE OF THEIR TECHNICAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES, MR. PARRY, TO PAKISTAN AND ARE PROPOSING TO ROUTE HIM THROUGH BAGHDAD. HE IS PLANNING TO ARRIVE ON WEDNESDAY, 15 JANUARY, AND WILL BE STAYING AT BAGHDAD HOTEL.

THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF HIS STAY IN BAGHDAD WILL BE TO TAKE UP AGAIN WITH THE IAF THE STEPS REQUIRED TO REPAIR SOME OF THE BAC.167B. B.A.C. WOULD ALSO EXPECT HIM TO PICK UP THROUGH CONTACTS WITH ARABI AND YOURSELF THE LATEST POSITION ON THEIR LIGHTNING OFFER, AND HE WILL BE CARRYING A FORMAL LETTER EXTENDING THE B.A.C. PROPOSAL FOR USE IF NECESSARY.

B.A.C. HAVE DECIDED ON THIS MOVE IN THE FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE LATEST POSITION REPORTED IN YOUR STOW 13. WE HAVE INFORMED MR. PARRY THAT HE SHOULD CALL UPON YOU BEFORE ENGAGING IN ANY OTHER DISCUSSIONS OR TALKS.

ORIG:- KIR 1(A)

INFO:- US/KIR

AS/KIR 1

FCO 0 DTED ✓

FCO EASTERN DEPARTMENT

FILE NO:- AP/7/03

AP/36/02



CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 2

10 JANUARY 1969


30

*in: Makin. Do we now need a submission?  
I fancy that we do.*

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R.E. 14/1.

ADDRESSED TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY TELEGRAM NUMBER STOW 2 OF  
10 JANUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE AND JEDDA.



MY STOW 13: LIGHTNINGS.

ABADI HAS NOW TOLD US THAT APPROVAL HAS BEEN GIVEN BOTH BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF BAATH PARTY AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR PURCHASE OF LIGHTNINGS. HOWEVER, IRAQIS ARE STILL MAINTAINING NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIANS FOR MIGS 23. THOUGH APPARENTLY MERELY AS REINSURANCE. TIKRITI HAS SECURED AGREEMENT OF SAUDI GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN AIRCRAFT FROM SAUDI ALLOCATION AND WAY IS NOW CLEAR FOR A DEAL. IT DOES NOT MATTER WHO COMES OUT TO FINALISE DEAL BUT IRAQIS PREFER THAT IT SHOULD BE SIGNED ON BRITISH SIDE BY A SENIOR REPRESENTATIVE OF GOVERNMENT. WE EXPLAINED THAT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT.  
2. ABADI REQUESTED THAT THIS SHOULD BE PASSED TO BROWN OF B.A.C., BUT WAS NOT CLEAR ON WHETHER HE PROPOSED A VISIT IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WE ARE MAKING FURTHER ENQUIRES ABOUT THIS.

F.C.O. PASS JEDDA.

MR. EVANS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

STOW DISTRIBUTION:

N.EASTERN D.

D.T.S.D.

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RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 15  
20 JAN 1969

British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD.

Copy.

NEQ 1/1

January 11, 1969.

An interesting letter

Mr. de la Torre

Ever

- ① Mr. Arthur
- ② Mr. Mackin
- ③ Arabian Dept.

Conversation with Brigadier  
Kadhim Abadi

is consider possible reaction under (iii)

R.E. 16/1

You will remember that I wrote in my letter 10/3 of 9 November, 1968 reporting a conversation with Brigadier Abadi. I had a long talk with him again this week which was rather remarkable, considering his background as a former Royalist officer. He made the following points:

(i) Lightnings

Approval had now been given by both the Central Committee of the Ba'ath Party and the Council of Ministers for the purchase of Lightnings. Moreover Tikriti had secured the agreement of the Saudi government to obtain early delivery by diverting to Iraq aircraft originally ordered for Saudi Arabia. The way was now clear, therefore, for a deal but the government were short of money (see (ii) below). However the Iraqis were still keeping a line open to the Russians in case they wished to purchase MIGs 23. He asked that Ian Brown of BAC should be informed (see our telegram STOW 2 of 10 January).

overlooked by STOW 3

(ii) Trade between the U.K. and Iraq

The present Ba'athi government were extremely keen to do trade with the United Kingdom on a grand scale. They were quite sincere in this and attached great importance to the forthcoming COMET Mission. It was a great opportunity for the U.K. as there was no other country in a comparable position.

The Iraqis were now indebted to the tune of ID 120 million (I am not quite sure what he meant by this; probably that the payments of this order had already been made against oil income as yet unaccrued.) He anticipated that the government might wish to do

.../business

A. R. Moore, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

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- 2 -

business worth some ID 200 million with us, including the Lightning deal, but they might only be able to find some ID 50 million in cash. The rest they would expect to raise on a long-term loan and the Ministers who visited the U.K. had been gratified by finding that they would be able to borrow money at 5½%. He anticipated that the Iraq government would reach a number of tentative agreements with the COMET Mission and then at the last moment would say that they required finance and that the agreements were conditional on this finance being forthcoming. The U.K. should however take this opportunity. The Iraqis were always good payers.

(iii) Image of the Ba'ath Party

Ministers were very concerned about the image of the Ba'ath Party. They were people who longed to be loved and were upset about recent press reports. He hoped that it would be possible for a responsible correspondent, possibly from The Times, to visit Iraq to talk to Ministers and obtain first hand impressions. A fair article written after such a visit could do a great deal of good. When I said that the government's principal difficulty seemed to be the "confidence gap" because their policies appeared reasonable but were not widely accepted by the people, he replied that the civilian part of the Ba'ath government was comparatively well ensconced but the military and security side was not yet firmly in the saddle.

(iv) Advice

The Ba'ath Party were pathetically looking for advice and encouragement and if we could give this in a discreet way over economic affairs it would be to the mutual advantage. I said that if anyone were to approach me informally about such advice I would naturally be willing to respond in suitable cases, but it was up to any Iraqis who felt so inclined to make the move. He stressed that, on account of Britain's long connection with this country, we were the only people really who could perform this function.

2. This country at the moment is a bewildering canvas of light and shade. On the one hand we are having a remarkably warm reception in all the economic Ministries - indeed a reception which, before I came here I would have thought quite impossible so soon after a resumption in diplomatic relations. On the other hand, as you know from other reports, extremely unpleasant things have been happening affecting Europeans. The Belgian Ambassador was threatened with arrest over the Bail case (Baghdad telegram No. 19 of 9 January, paragraph 4), the Danish Chargé d'Affaires was bundled out of his car at gun point at

.../the





- 3 -

the International School on 7 January - both were victims of the current Anti-American witch hunt - and Bob Hamilton's garden was trespassed upon on 9 January when armed and uniformed men came in and searched the saddle bag of his gardener's bicycle and then removed him. These sorts of incidents have naturally caused considerable consternation.

3. There have also been a number of further arrests of Iraqis and many of those in the professional and commercial classes are undoubtedly frightened. Nonetheless there is no general feeling of tension in the streets at the moment - at any rate by day - and Iraqis do not appear to be as frightened as one would expect. The situation is therefore full of paradox.

4. One might have thought that this sort of atmosphere might have brought business nearly to a standstill. However this is not the case. The economic Ministries, particularly the Ministry of Industry, is humming with activity and considerable business is still being done in the Private Sector. The business climate as far as we are concerned is excellent; one hears this on all sides, though I shall be happier when we can see the effect in terms of concrete British exports. One is tempted to think that it is too good to be true and may not last, but, while it persists, we should not hesitate to do as much business as we can, preferably "over the counter". We are more privileged than a number of other countries for, we understand confidentially, that all consumer imports, durable and non durable, from Italy, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Rumania, Poland and Japan are being prevented in view of Iraq's unfavourable trade balance with these countries. Reduced quotas for capital goods are also being introduced for Italy, Denmark, Finland and Greece.

5. One who has been as long as I have in the Middle East must remain rather sceptical about the longer term but the opportunity now presented must not be neglected and our general motto should be "Carpe Diem".

Yours Ever

Very unenlightened  
in terms of economic

theory. It is aggregate (D. F. Hawley)

exports and imports which

make. In terms of aggregates, it is better to buy

c.c. T. H. Sinclair, Esq.,  
Board of Trade.

C. B. Benjamin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Technology.

CONFIDENTIAL

cheaply from one  
country than more  
expensively from  
another.

R.E.

16/1.

If that were all the Iraqis were  
unenlightened about, I would not mind.



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32

CYPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY FROM BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NO STOW 3

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY  
17 JANUARY 1969

RECEIVED ARCHIVES No. 15 20 JAN 1969 NEQ 10/1
--

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO MINTECH TEL NO STOW 3 OF 17 JANUARY.  
FOR BENJAMIN.

YOUR TEL NO STOW 4.

2. PARRY HAS NOW SEEN KAHIM ABADI WHO TOLD HIM MUCH THE SAME *pa.*  
AS I REPORTED IN MY TELNO STOW 2. ABADI MADE IT PLAIN THAT *Qm 20/1*  
ALTHOUGH A TECHNICAL DECISION IN FAVOUR OF LIGHTNINGS HAD ALREADY  
BEEN TAKEN, THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER PROGRESS UNTIL THE  
VISIT OF THE C Q M E T MISSION. IT SEEMS THAT CREDIT MAY  
THEREFORE BE THE CRUCIAL FACTOR AT PRESENT, ALTHOUGH ABADI INTIMATED  
THAT THE DEAL MIGHT GO THROUGH IN ANY CASE.  
3. PLEASE INFORM B A C AND SUGGEST THAT THEY CONTACT LORD LIMERICK  
OF KLEINWORT BENSON, WHO WILL BE DEPUTY LEADER OF THE  
COMET MISSION.

MR EVANS


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Action: EIRia  
Info: US/EIR  
AS/EIR  
FCO-DTSD  
Eastern Dept  
File: AP/47/05

CONFIDENTIAL

XXXXXX





Mr. Arthur

Lightnings for Iraq

We have been asked to brief Mr. Gallagher for the E.S.C.(O) meeting on Monday afternoon. I attach a draft brief.

2. I recommend that it would be premature to agree to an export licence or to consult Ministers at this stage. The Ministry of Technology note is misleading. The arguments are developed in the attached brief.

*D. J. Makinson*  
(D. J. Makinson)  
Near Eastern Department  
16 January, 1969.

I agree.

2. The political paragraphs of the Nutech draft paper contain some of the most ridiculous stuff I have ever read. On no account should we accept what is said in those paragraphs.

3. We should not however go against

SECRET

the supply of lightnings to Iraq. We shd. clear our own lines in this Office next week. Pl. submit to me soon.

*minute*  
*in Crosshair.*

*Mr. Makinson*

*Reg & pa.*

*22 17*



Registry  
No.

DRAFT Brief

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

To:—

From

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

Mr. Gallagher

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Copies to:

Mr. Arthur  
Mr. Crosthwait  
Sir E. Peck  
Mr. Sykes (DPD)  
Arabian Dept.

Flag A ———

Flag B

Flag C

Lightnings for Iraq

Talking Points

The latest information available to us, and we believe, to the Ministry of Technology, is contained in Baghdad telegram STOW 2 of 2 January, 1969 (attached) which merely relays the views of the "ten per center" involved.

It seems to be somewhat overstating the case to say, as is done in the first line of the Ministry of Technology's note of 15 January, that "the Iraq Government have asked the British Aircraft Corporation to start detailed contractual negotiations ...."

2. The Overseas Policy and Defence Committee Paper of November 1967 agreed that, rather than encourage or prohibit exploratory sales visits to various countries in advance of the "point of sale" date (when political conditions might well have altered), it was preferable to allow sales missions to go forward without commitment. BAC are well aware of this. It follows that the fact that sales negotiations have proceeded cannot ~~now~~ be used as an argument for agreeing to a sale.

3. To give permission now, in the changing and difficult conditions prevailing in revolutionary Iraq would be to risk having to

/withdraw...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



withdraw that permission if in fact the reports turned out to be wrong, and the "point of sale" were not reached for two or three weeks: a possibility that cannot be excluded.

4. It is therefore premature to give a decision or to seek a ruling from Ministers.

5. We do not necessarily accept the political arguments in paragraphs 11-14 of the note, but there is in any case no need to go beyond paragraph 4 above.

[If pressed on political factors]

(a) Para. 11 of Mintech Note.

The present régime in Iraq has shown little evidence of being more favourably inclined to the West than its predecessor.

(b) Para. 12, lines 8 and 9

For Iraq to have the same equipment as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait does not necessarily mean that their foreign policies will be the same.

#### Background

6. Although regularly pressed to give an indication of our attitude to a possible sale, we have been guided by the O.P.D. paper of November 1967, and have consistently said that in view of the changing situation in Iraq we could only give a decision when a request to purchase was actually made, taking into account conditions at the time.

7. It has been our experience that BAC and the Ministry of Technology (prompted by BAC's contact man on the spot) have painted a somewhat optimistic picture.

*Flag B*

*Flag B*

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SECRET

Reference.....

Mr. Makinson - Near Eastern Dept.

Lightnings for Iraq

RECEIVED

ARCHIVES No. 15

20 JAN 1968

NEQ 10/1

(34)

Mr. Crosthwait has asked me to make the following suggestions on the brief for Mr. Gallagher which you sent to us for comment.

*we have no evidence either way.*

2. Our first point is that there is more in the Ministry of Technology attitude than the opening paragraph of the brief would imply. BAC have a representative at present in Baghdad who is in touch with those concerned and it seems to us that although the opening statement by the Ministry of Technology is not at this moment correct, it could become so at short notice.

3. We would suggest that the second and subsequent paragraphs of the brief should read as follows:-

"2. The policy on the sale of arms to Iraq and the Arab countries is contained in OPD(67)78, which states that in general although we should not supply arms which are exclusively offensive in character there is no objection in principle to the supply of aircraft such as the Lightning (which is specifically mentioned) which is primarily a defensive weapon. Any actual sale, however, has to be considered in the light of circumstances at the time."

"3. The paper indicates that it is preferable to allow sales negotiations to take place without commitment rather than to encourage or prohibit such negotiations before the point had been reached at which a definite offer might be made. BAC and indeed all the major arms supply firms are well aware of this policy and are accustomed to operating within it. We do not regard the fact that negotiations are being conducted as an argument for approving a sale.

"4. It would be unwise to indicate to BAC at this stage that we will necessarily give permission now for a sale in the future. It does not seem essential to do this; but there is no harm in doing so as part of the present negotiations."

"5. In the changing and difficult conditions prevailing in revolutionary Iraq the risk exists that permission if given might have to be withdrawn, if in fact the Ministry of Technology's information is wrong. [We should also bear in mind that although Baghdad telegram STOW 2 of 2 January states that the Saudis have agreed to divert aircraft to Iraq we have not been able to find any evidence to support this statement.]

*hypothesis*

"6. It is therefore recommended that you should tell the meeting that the time has not yet arrived when we would be justified in approaching Ministers to give approval to a sale.

SECRET

/This

SECRET



SECRET

[This is not to say that the Ministry of Technology's attitude is unfounded; their experience indicates that the stage where approval is required can be reached very quickly and with little prior warning.]  
[However, it appears on the evidence which has so far been produced, that the point at which a sales offer might be made is not yet in sight and that, furthermore, the suggestion that aircraft already in production might be diverted to Iraq as an inducement to them to make a quick proposal has not been [substantiated] confirmed.

[Flag A]

"7. You may also wish to bring to the notice of the meeting that political factors set out in the Ministry of Technology paper were not agreed with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and that we contest many of the statements made therein. There would appear, however, to be no reason why discussion beyond that set out above would be necessary."

4. We consider that the rest of the paper can stand.

(D. J. S. Murray)  
17 January, 1969

DEFENCE TRAINING & SUPPLY DEPT.

*Spoken.*

*Reg & me.*


*17/11*

SECRET

SECRET



Mr. Arthur



Lightnings for Iraq

Problem

Should we agree to the sale to Iraq of Lightnings equipped with Red Top missiles when, as seems possible in the near future, the Iraqi government ask the British Aircraft Corporation to discuss contracts?

Recommendation

I recommend that if an order were placed we would, should conditions remain unchanged, agree, but that we will not agree until the Iraqis make a firm request to purchase.

There is still no firm evidence that the Iraqis have asked to buy the aircraft. Until they do we should limit ourselves to agreeing a view within the Foreign Office, which we could later modify in the light of subsequent events, should this be necessary.

Argument

1. The Lightning aircraft, equipped with the Red Top air to air missile, is in effect a flying launching platform. It is expensive and not particularly efficient in other roles such as ground attack. It is less "offensive" in character, though more modern, than the Hunters we have already supplied to Iraq.



2. The Lightning (and Red Top) is relatively more sophisticated than Hunter, but suffers by comparison with the Phantom IV which the Americans have already agreed to supply to Israel.

3. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Kuwait, who would be most likely to dislike the sale, have any objection. Iran has the Phantom IV and is unlikely to be seriously concerned.

4. The attitude of the Iraqi Ba'athist government, which is revolutionary and quasi Marxist in doctrine, is anything but helpful to Great Britain. They have indulged in a campaign of widespread arrests and spy trials: they have been obstructive and antagonistic to the Iraqi Petroleum Company. They indulge in abusive propaganda about Western Imperialism. Nevertheless, to withhold our permission would do no more than register our displeasure and double theirs; France and Russia, and perhaps others, would be ready to step into the breach and supply the aircraft.

5. There are good financial and industrial reasons, which the Ministry of Technology will forcefully represent, why the production line should be kept open. Unless further orders are received plant will be shut down and men laid off: later orders, even if obtained, would cost more.



6. The Lightning order for Saudi Arabia, obtained four years ago, is being fulfilled now, but the aircraft are being placed in store, not in service. It seems probable that aircraft could be diverted from this order, with Saudi Arabian agreement, to supply Iraq's immediate needs.

Background

1. The Overseas Policy and Defence Committee Paper of November 1967 agreed that, rather than encourage or prohibit exploratory sales visits to various countries in advance of the "point of sale" date (when political conditions might well have altered) it was preferable to allow sales missions to go forward without commitment. B.A.C. are well aware of this. It follows that the fact that sales negotiations have proceeded cannot now be used as the argument for agreeing to a sale.

2. We are regularly pressed to give some indication of what our views would be if a firm offer were made. We have always declined to do so, on the grounds that conditions can change rapidly.

3. The question was raised in the Strategic Exports Committee on 20 January, when we argued that it was premature to decide now. It is likely to be raised in the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee (of the



SECRET

-4-

Cabinet) early in February. It would be useful to agree a Foreign and Commonwealth Office view in advance of the O.P.D. meeting.

*D. J. Makinson*

(D. J. Makinson)  
Near Eastern Department  
17 January, 1969

See Tel. to Tehran Unwair + Tedda. If they produce no objections, I shall accept this recommendation

Mr. Makinson

B.N.

*25*  
noted.  
Feb

SECRET





SECRET

Copy to F.G.K. Gallagher,  
F. & C.O.

Copy No. 4

36

M. Macdonald (NEQ)

BOARD OF TRADE

EXPORT POLICY & PROMOTION DIVISION

1 Victoria Street, LONDON S.W.1

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Tele: 25955 Answer Back: BOTHQ LONDON

Telegrams: Advantage London S.W.1

Telephone: ABBEY 7877, ext. 2360

Our reference: XF.106 G.

Your reference:

NEQ 10/1

24 January 1969

Supply of Lightning Aircraft to Iraq

At the meeting of the Strategic Exports (Official) Committee on Monday, 20th January, reference was made to the forthcoming mission to Iraq being mounted by the Council for Middle East Trade (COMET), a possible link between this and the sale of Lightnings having been referred to in Baghdad telegram STOW.3 of 17th January.

This mission under the leadership of Mr. Kenneth Dick, the Chairman of COMET, is a six-man team leaving the U.K. on 30th January and spending about a week in Iraq. Its purpose is to take stock of commercial prospects in Iraq in the changed political situation and to evaluate market opportunities for the sale of British goods in particular sectors. There is no question of this being a "hard sell" mission and it is not briefed to discuss either the sale of arms and military equipment or terms of credit. It will be for B.A.C. to judge whether or not to appraise the mission of its current negotiations but it is certainly not our intention that the members should involve themselves in any negotiations for the sale of hardware.

In these circumstances we do not think that there is any need to refer to the COMET mission in the paper now being revised and any relevant conclusions which the mission may come to, can, if time permits this, be incorporated in B.O.T. briefing when the paper is taken.

I am copying this letter to Tallboys, M.O.D., Gallagher, F.C.O., Lucas, Treasury and Morris, D.E.A., as well as to Hibbs in our C.R.E. Department.

C.B. Benjamin, Esq.,  
Ministry of Technology,  
EIR.1(a), Room 305,  
Stuart House,  
Soho Square,  
London, W.1.

(D. CHURCH)

SECRET



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CYPHER/CAT.A. & BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 62

TO TEHRAN

27 JANUARY 1969 (ENEQ)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO. 62 OF 27 JANUARY AND TO KUWAIT AND JEDDA REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO BAGHDAD. PERSONAL FROM ARTHUR.

IF THE IRAQIS SEEK TO PLACE A FIRM ORDER FOR THE SUPPLY OF LIGHTNING AIRCRAFT WE SHALL HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO LICENCE THE EXPORT.

2. THE KUWAIT MINISTER OF DEFENCE, WHEN SOUNDED HYPOTHETICALLY LAST AUTUMN, SAID THAT KUWAIT WOULD WELCOME SUCH A SALE SINCE THE REDUCTION OF IRAQ'S DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET BLOC WOULD BE GOOD FOR ALL (KUWAIT TEL NO. 460 OF 1967). SAUDI AIR FORCE OFFICERS HAVE SAID INFORMALLY THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING BECAUSE OF THE SAUDI INTEREST IN KEEPING THE LIGHTNING PRODUCTION LINE GOING AND ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT ARAB "ALLIES" SHOULD BE UNIFORMLY EQUIPPED (JEDDA TEL. NO. 8).

3. WE DID NOT SEEK TEHRAN'S COMMENTS EARLIER BECAUSE THE POSSIBILITY WAS HYPOTHETICAL BUT WE SHOULD NOW LIKE TO HAVE THEIR VIEW (WITHOUT CONSULTING THE IRANIANS AT THIS STAGE). WE ASSUME THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD TAKE THE VIEW THAT IF IRAQ WAS TO HAVE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AT ALL IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT THEY SHOULD COME FROM US RATHER THAN FROM SOVIET OR EVEN FRENCH SOURCES..

4. IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO HAVE ANY SECOND THOUGHTS FROM KUWAIT OR JEDDA.

STEWART

FILES:

N.EASTERN D.

MR. ARTHUR

ARABIAN D.

D.T.S.D.

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DEPARTMENT

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NEQ

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s)

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PRIORITY MARKINGS

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Immediate  
Priority  
Routine

(Date)

Dispatched

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PRIVACY MARKING

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En Clair.  
Code  
Cypher

[Security classification  
—if any]

Confidential

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to Tehran

telegram No. 62 (date) 27 JAN 1969

And to Kuwait and Jeddah (Priority)

repeated for information to

Saving to Baghdad

Personal from Arthur.

If the Iraqis seek to place a firm order for the supply of Lightning aircraft we shall have to decide whether to licence the export.

2. The Kuwait Minister of Defence, when sounded hypothetically last autumn, said that Kuwait would welcome such a sale since the reduction of Iraq's dependence on the Soviet Bloc would be good for all (Kuwait tel no. 460 of 1967). Saudi ~~ARM~~ Air Force officers have said informally that it would be a good thing because of the Saudi interest in keeping the Lightning production line going and on the general principle that Arab "allies" should be uniformly equipped (Jedda tel. no. 8).

3. We did not seek Tehran's comments earlier because the possibility was hypothetical but we should now like to have their view (without consulting the Iranians at this stage). We assume that the  
/Iranians ...

Draft Telegram to:—

Tehran

No. 62

(Date) 27/1

Jedda  
Kuwait

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Baghdad

Distribution:—

Arabian  
N.E.D.  
D.T. &  
Supply

Copies to:—

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27/1  
12252  
27/1/69



Confidential

Iranians would take the view that if Iraq was to have fighter aircraft at all it would be better that they should come from us rather than from Soviet or even French sources.

4. It would also be useful to have any second thoughts from Kuwait or Jedda.

*JS*  
27/1

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



CONFIDENTIAL .

CYPHER/CAT A  
ROUTINE JEDDA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 723

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
29 DECEMBER 1968

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 723 OF 29 DECEMBER R F I TO BAGHDAD  
AND MINTECH

BAGHDAD TELNO 544 TO FCO: LIGHTNINGS.

THE AIR ATTACHE IS VISITING RIYADH TOMORROW AND WILL SEE  
WHAT HE CAN PICK UP.

2. THERE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE ADVANTAGE TO THE SAUDIS IF  
IRAQ BOUGHT LIGHTNINGS (A) THE LIGHTNING PRODUCTION LINE  
WOULD BE KEPT GOING FOR ANOTHER YEAR OR TWO AND THE SAUDIS  
WOULD BE ABLE TO DELAY A DECISION ON ORDERING FURTHER AIRCRAFT  
(B) LIGHTNINGS ARRIVING HERE NOW ARE BEING PUT INTO DEEP  
STORAGE. THIS IS EXPENSIVE AND DIFFICULT AND IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY  
BE SENSIBLE IF IRAQ WERE TO BE SUPPLIED FROM CURRENT PRODUCTION  
(OR EVEN FROM AIRCRAFT ALREADY DELIVERED HERE) WHILE THE  
SAUDIS WAITED UNTIL THEY WERE PROPERLY TRAINED.

3. ONE CANNOT HOWEVER ASSUME THAT THE SAUDIS WOULD BE SO LOGICAL  
AND ON PAST FORM IT IS AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT  
THEY WOULD PREFER TO STICK TO THE LETTER OF THEIR CONTRACT.  
IN ANY CASE I SHOULD GUESS THAT THEY WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO  
PROVIDE ANY FINANCIAL HELP. THIS WAS NOT EASILY ARRANGED EVEN  
FOR JORDAN, A REGIME TOWARDS WHICH SAUDI ATTITUDES ARE A  
GOOD DEAL MORE CLEAR CUT THAN TOWARDS IRAQ.

FCO PASS BAGHDAD AND MINTECH .

MR. CRAIG

[COPIES SENT TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY]  
[REPEATED TO BAGHDAD]

FILES  
N. EAST. D.  
N. AFR. D.  
ARABIAN D.  
DEF. POL. D.  
D.T.S.D.  
SCI. & TECH. D.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A.

ROUTINE JEDDA.

TELEGRAM NO 8.

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.

5 JANUARY 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 8 OF 5 JANUARY RFI TO BAGHDAD AND MINTECH

MY TELNO 723 LIGHTNINGS FOR IRAQ.

AIR ATTACHE DISCUSSED THIS WITH SOME RSAF OFFICERS ON  
31 DECEMBER (THE COMMANDER WAS ILL). ALL WELCOMED THE  
IDEA OF AN IRAQI PURCHASE ON THE GROUNDS BOTH OF POINT (A)  
IN MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE AND OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT  
ALLIES SHOULD HAVE UNIFORM EQUIPMENT. POINT (B) WAS  
NOT SO POPULAR, SOME OF THEM SAYING THAT A BIRD IN THE HAND  
WAS WORTH TWO IN THE BUSH.

FCO PASS BAGHDAD AND MINTECH.

MR. CRAIG

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[COPIES SENT TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY]

FILES

N. EAST. D.

N. AFRI. D.

ARABIAN DEPT.

DEF. POL. DEPT.

D.T.S.D.

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY DEPT.

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CONFIDENTIAL

YPHER CAT A

PRIORITY FROM BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM 544

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

21 DECEMBER 1968

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 544 OF 21 DECEMBER REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO JEDDAH AND MINTECH.

LIGHTNINGS.

MY TELEGRAM NO STOW 13 (NOT TO ALL).

THE AIR FORCE APPEAR TO WANT LIGHTNINGS, DESPITE REPORTS WE HAVE  
HEARD TO THE CONTRARY, BUT MAY BE INHIBITED BY LACK OF MONEY.

THEY MAY HOPE THAT THE SAUDIS CAN BE PERSUADED TO FINANCE THE  
PURCHASE OF PART OF THEIR REQUIREMENT OR GRANT THEM A LOAN.

THEY MIGHT IN ANY CASE ASK THE SAUDIS TO RELEASE SOME AIRCRAFT  
NOW EARMARKED FOR THEM AGAINST SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT FROM THE  
IRAQI ORDER IF PLACED (MY TELEGRAM NO 385).

2. THE SAUDIS MAY HAVE AN INTEREST IN BEING FORTHCOMING IF, LIKE  
THE KUWAITIS, THEY WOULD PREFER TO SEE THE IRAQI AIR FORCE EQUIPPED  
WITH WESTERN RATHER THAN RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT. (KUWAIT TEL NO 462 OF  
10 OCTOBER TO FCO). THERE WOULD BE OBVIOUS ADVANTAGES FOR THE  
ARAB COUNTRIES GENERALLY, IF THE IRAQIS JOINED THOSE STATES EQUIPPED  
WITH LIGHTNINGS AND THEY MIGHT WISH TO OBLIGE TAKNITI, WHO  
CREATED A GOOD IMPRESSION IN JEDDAH (JEDDAH TEL NO 658 TO FCO  
OF 9 NOVEMBER). THERE ALREADY APPEARS TO BE A DEGREE OF TECHNICAL  
CONSULTATION. THE SAUDIS GAVE A FAVOURABLE SHOWING OF THE LIGHTNING  
TO THE IRAQIS IN NOVEMBER (STOW NO 8) AND MARCONIS HAVE TOLD US  
THAT THE IRAQIS ARE OBTAINING DETAILS FROM THE SAZDISC  
TOPOSPHERIC SCALTON EQUIPMENT.

3. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF H M AMBASSADOR IN JEDDAH COULD DISCOVER  
WHAT THE PRESENT SAUDI ATTITUDE IS TOWARD THE B.A.C. LIGHTNING DEAL.

FCO PLEASE PASS JEDDAH AND MINTECH.

EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO JEDDAH]

[COPIES PASSED TO MINTECH (CASTLEWOOD HOUSE)].

FILES

N.EAST DEPT.

N.AFR DEPT.

ARAB DEPT.

DEF POL DEPT.

D.T. & S.D.

SCI & TECH DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY TEHRAN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 86

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

29 JANUARY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 86 OF 29 JANUARY, REPEATED  
TO KUWAIT, JEDDA AND BAGHDAD.  
FOLLOWING FOR ARTHUR.

YOUR TEL NO 62: LIGHTNINGS FOR IRAQ.

38  
NE  
TOP COPY  
RECEIVED  
ARCHIVES No. 15  
29 JAN 1969  
NEQ 10/1

IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR LINE IN THE PAST FOR THE IRANIANS  
TO TAKE THE VIEW SUGGESTED IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM AND I WOULD  
EXPECT THEM TO TAKE IT IN THIS CASE, PARTICULARLY SINCE OUR  
GENERAL RELATIONS WITH THEM ARE NOT BAD AT PRESENT AND THE SHAH CONSI-  
-DERS THE EXISTING IRAQI REGIME TO BE MORE TOLERABLE FROM IRAN'S  
POINT OF VIEW THAN ANY LIKELY ALTERNATIVE.

2. I THINK IT IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT I SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO  
WARN THE IRANIANS IF THE DEAL LOOKS LIKE BECOMING ACTUAL AND AS  
LONG AS POSSIBLE BEFORE ANYTHING BECOMES PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, I  
SHOULD LIKE AT THE SAME TIME TO BE ABLE TO TELL THEM HOW WE  
THINK THE SAUDIS AND KUWAITIS WILL REACT.

FCO PASS BAGHDAD.

SIR D. WRIGHT.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES  
N.EAST. DEPT.  
MR. ARTHUR  
ARAB. DEPT.  
D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL





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(39)  
NE

CYPHER/CAT A  
PRIORITY JEDDA  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 49

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
30 JANUARY 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 49 OF 30 JANUARY REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO KUWAIT TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD.

(37)  
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 62 TO TEHRAN. PERSONAL FOR ARTHUR.

LIGHTNINGS FOR IRAQ.

MASOUD, DEPUTY U S AT M F A, SPEAKING PERSONALLY  
TOLD ME TODAY THAT HE THOUGHT THE SAUDI ~~GOVT~~ WOULD WELCOME  
ANYTHING WHICH LESSENERED THE DEPENDENCE OF ARAB COUNTRIES  
ON RUSSIAN ARMS.

2. QUOTE SPEAKING PERSONALLY UNQUOTE MERELY MEANS THAT HE  
WOULD NEVER SPEAK FOR THE SAUDI ~~GOVT~~ WITHOUT  
SPECIFIC AUTHORITY. I SEE NO REASON TO DOUBT  
THAT THIS WOULD BE KING FAISALS VIEW.

F C O PASS SAVING TO KUWAIT TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD.

MR. MORRIS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILE S  
N. EAST. D.  
MR. ARTHUR  
ARABIAN D.  
D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

PA. ~~MM~~

5/2



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NL

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CYPHER/CAT A  
PRIORITY KUWAIT  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 51

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
30 JANUARY 1969.

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 15  
31 JAN 1969  
NE&10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

(37) ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 51 OF 30 JANUARY RFI TO TEHRAN AND  
JEDDA AND SAVING TO BAGHDAD (FCO PASS BAGHDAD SAVING)  
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR ARTHUR  
YOUR TELNO 62 TO TEHRAN  
LIGHTNINGS FOR IRAQ

ALTHOUGH SHAIKH SA'AD APPEARED READY LAST AUTUMN TO WELCOME  
THE SALE OF LIGHTNINGS TO IRAQ (KUWAIT TELNO 480), I THINK  
THE DOUBTS EXPRESSED IN KUWAIT TELNO 93 OF 1968 ARE STILL VALID,  
AT LEAST AS FAR AS THE AMIR IS CONCERNED. THE KUWAITIS NOW  
HAVE FEW ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE IRAQI REGIME AND REGARD IT AS  
IRRESPONSIBLE UNSTABLE AND WEAK. THEY MUST ALSO FEAR THAT A  
SUCCESSOR IS LIKELY ONE DAY TO BE MUCH MORE HOSTILE TO KUWAIT.  
2. THEY WOULD PROBABLY TAKE A SALE BETTER IF WE COULD DEMONSTRATE  
THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD HAVE BOUGHT A LIGHTNING EQUIVALENT ANYWAY.  
3. WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO RAISE THIS WITH SA'AD AT A CONVENIENT  
OPPORTUNITY?

SN and  
File

MR. FALLE

PA P/M 4/2

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]


FILES  
N.EAST. DEPT.  
MR. ARTHUR  
ARAB. DEPT.  
D.T.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL



COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

41



Mr. Arthur

Lightnings for Iraq

Telegram No.51 from Kuwait to F.C.O.  
Personal for you.

2. I suggest that we reply as in the  
draft telegram attached.

---

*P. R. M. Hinchcliffe*

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)  
Near Eastern Department  
31 January, 1969.

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL



SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret  
Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

Flash  
Immediate }  
Priority  
Routine

(Date).....

Despatched .....

PRIVACY MARKING

*In Confidence*

*En Clair.*  
*Code*  
*Cypher*

[Security classification  
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any].....

Addressed to KUWAIT

telegram No.....(date) .....

And to .....

repeated for information to BAGHDAD

Saving to.....

Draft Telegram to:—

Kuwait

No. ....

(Date) .....

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Baghdad

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

N.E.D.

D.T.S.D.

Arabian Dept.  
Copies to:—

No other  
distribution.

Your telegram No.51 [of 31/1 7]:

Lightnings for Iraq.

Although after this week's events in Baghdad the chances of receiving a firm order from the Iraqis have probably diminished it would still be useful to sound Saad hypothetically at a convenient opportunity.

2. We agree that a useful line might be the probability of the Iraqis obtaining equivalent aircraft from elsewhere if we were to refuse to supply Lightnings. It is known for instance that they have been negotiating with the Russians for MIG 23s. This is similar to the argument expressed in Kuwait telegram No.93 of 1968.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 FEB 1969 NEQ 10/1
--

(42)

Mr. Hinchcliffe

*PMW*

Lightnings for Iraq

Mr. Arthur asked me to look at this qua Kuwait. He thought that in the present quite unpredictable situation in Baghdad there was no point in putting the question afresh to Saad (who after all answered without hesitation when it was put to him before and might begin to wonder what we were up to).

2. On looking over the file (it was not attached when Mr. Arthur saw the draft telegram) I was sure that Mr. Arthur was right. Saad would not speak off the cuff unless he was sure of his ground and he spoke as he did as recently as October. If the Iraqis came in with a request in the very near future, we would obviously have to think very carefully because of the present state of British public opinion over them. If they were to come up later, anything could have happened in Baghdad meanwhile. I have, therefore, sent a different telegram, and I attach a copy.

...

3. The end of Mr. Makinson's submission of 17 January anticipated an OPD discussion early this month. I do not know if this will be pressed by the Ministry of Technology in the view of recent events in Iraq. It seems clear from the recent telegrams that the way ahead is clear in Jedda and that there is no obstacle obvious to our people in Tehran. But Mr. Tripp considers that we should have to put the issue to the Iranians.

4. I think we can await either OPD or a further Iraqi request before deciding to bother the posts concerned again, and at that time consult both the Iranians and the Kuwaitis. The material in your draft telegram will then be relevant (if unchanged!)

*[Signature]*

(D.J. McCarthy)  
4 February 1969

*pa PMW*  
*5/2*

CONFIDENTIAL



REQ

CONFIDENTIAL

KUWIAT

KUWAIT

SAVING: TEHRAN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD

(SAVING)

TEHRAN  
JEDDA  
BAGHDAD

Your tel. no. 51 [of 31 January].

Iraq and Lightnings.

Your paragraph 3. We would rather that you did not repeat not raise this with Saad again unless we send later instructions. We *can reconsider if and when* ~~will send these if there were~~ a firm request *is received* for supply from Iraq and ~~at the same time~~ ~~give you whatever guidance the then situation~~ ~~in Iraq and other factors made appropriate.~~

*File*  
Departmental

Near Eastern  
DTSD  
Arman



CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

43

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG  
ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 29

TO KUWAIT  
3 FEBRUARY 1969.  
(NEQ) 10/1

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO KUWAIT TELEGRAM NO 29 OF 3/2 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
SAVING: TEHRAN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD

YOUR TEL NO 51. <sup>120</sup>OF 31 JANUARY/  
IRAQ AND LIGHTNINGS.

YOUR PARAGRAPH 3. WE WOULD RATHER THAT YOU DID NOT REPEAT  
NOT RAISE THIS WITH SAAD AGAIN UNLESS WE SEND LATER INSTRUCTIONS.  
WE CAN RECONSIDER IF AND WHEN A FIRM REQUEST FOR SUPPLY <sup>IXS</sup>  
RECEIVED FROM IRAQ.

STEWART

F I L E S

NEAR EASTERN DEPT.  
D.T. S.D.  
ARABIAN DEPT.  
MR. ARTHUR  
MR. KILLICK

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN



Registry No.  
DEPARTMENT

**BA**

NEQ

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Top Secret~~  
~~Secret~~  
Confidential  
~~Restricted~~  
Unclassified

~~Flash~~  
~~Immediate~~ } \*  
~~Priority~~  
Routine

(Date)

Despatched

4/2

0759.

**CYPHER**

PRIVACY MARKING

*In Confidence*

*En Clair.*  
*Code*  
*Cypher*

[Security classification  
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to KUWAIT

telegram No. 29 (date) 3/2

And to

repeated for information to SAVING: TEHRAN, JEDDA, BAGHDAD

Saving to

Draft Telegram to:—  
KUWAIT

No. 29

(Date) 3/2

And to:—

Repeat to:—  
(SAVING)  
~~TEHRAN~~  
~~JEDDA~~  
~~BAGHDAD~~

Saving to:—

Your tel. no. 51 [of 31 January].

Iraq and Lightnings.

Your paragraph 3. We would rather that  
you did not repeat not raise this with Saad  
again unless we send later instructions. We  
~~will send these if there were a firm request~~  
~~is received~~  
for supply from Iraq ~~and at the same time~~  
~~give you whatever guidance the then situation~~  
~~in Iraq and other factors made appropriate.~~

*Files*  
Departmental  
Distribution:—  
Near Eastern  
DTSD  
Arabian

Copies to:—

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

3/2  
18203/3

3/2





## MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIR1(a)

Room 305

Stuart House, 23-25 Soho Square, LONDON W1

Telex: 22241 Telegrams: Mintech London Telex

Telephone: 01-437 9288, ext. 105

Our reference: AP/99/08

Your reference: CS.B/1141/69

10<sup>th</sup> February, 1969

Dear Department,

<sup>n/R</sup>  
Helicopters for Iraq

Thank you for your letter of 15th January, which has been passed to us by Board of Trade.

We relayed the contents to Mr. M. Jones, of Westland Aircraft Ltd., who, it transpires, had already planned to visit Baghdad (in transit for a visit to Pakistan) towards the end of February in the context of the Iraqi Air Force interest in a further purchase of Wessex helicopters. He will take this opportunity to follow up the Security Police (?) requirement.

For your own information, Mr. Jones does not propose to contact the firm of Moosa Ali and Sons, at any rate, at this stage. Westlands are wary of entangling themselves with an Iraqi "agent" following an incident some months ago when a High Court action was brought against them by Hofthi Aziz for 5% commission on the value of the IAF order for 12 Wessex helicopters.

Because of the current situation in Iraq, Mr. Jones is trying to get his visit officially sponsored through the Iraqi Air Attache in London on the strength of the IAF interest in further Wessexes. He will, however, write to Colonel Sharpe to advise him of his proposed plans for the Iraqi visit.

I am enclosing an extra copy of my letter for Colonel Sharpe.

Yours sincerely,

(C. B. BENJAMIN)

Commercial Department  
British Embassy  
Baghdad  
Iraq

14 PMM  
12/2



**Hidden Copies:-** Lt. Col. Sharpe, British Embassy, Baghdad.  
Mr. E. A. Arnoux, ESB; Bd of Trade  
US/EIR  
AS/EIR1  
FCO - Near Eastern Dept.  
" - DTSD  
MOD - DS.13



SECRET

45

(10/3)



BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEL AVIV.

11 March, 1969.

*Dear Geoffrey,*

Arms for Iran

*My Trip*  
I do not accept this 100%: but I have often thought we ought to consider the effect of selling sophisticated arms to the

Please refer to Trevor Evans' telegram No. 254 "difficult" which I have just received Saving by bag. I am *Arabs.* sure the whole arms business must be giving you a terrible headache and I hope therefore that you will not mind some comment from this Post. *17*

2. I myself would be all for an arms deal with Iraq worth many millions of pounds which would spill over into the telecommunications and electronic market. As Trevor points out we might also hope to reap considerable political dividends. The approach described in Baghdad telegram No. 193 looks as if the Iraqis might really mean business, though I expect the talk of loans or long-term credits may make us a bit wary. At any rate, it is not as bad as in the days of Nuri, who seemed to expect us to provide him with most of his arms free so as to reap the maximum political benefit.

*So he did!*

*He need not worry: I shall not be.*

3. If this proposition really does develop you will doubtless be thinking of Israel reactions. I do not think we should necessarily be over-sensitive to these. There has been little disposition here to criticise our big deals with Saudi Arabia and Libya. Nor have our deliveries to Jordan, including that of "Tigercat", been played up either at the political level or in the press. Admittedly, as long as there are Iraqi troops in Jordan Iraq will be looked on here as one of the "front line" Arab states in whose hands arms can be used directly against Israel. To this extent the only weapons about which Israel might have a valid complaint would be rockets or heavy artillery which could be used to hit Israel settlements from the Iraqi positions on the heights above the Jordan Valley.

/What the

G.G. Arthur, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

SECRET



SECRET



What the Israelis would be most sensitive about would be if we agreed to deliver to Iraq aircraft of a type which the Israelis themselves wanted but which we refused to sell them. Conversely the sale of aircraft to Iraq might have to be offset by agreeing to allow our manufacturers to break into the very profitable Israel market.

4. If we ever do have to answer Israel complaints I suggest we do not try and make a differentiation between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons. Israelis are sophisticated enough to know that this is pretty well meaningless (I remember turning down an Israel application for 200 parachutes, at the time we were selling Centurions to Iraq, on the grounds that they were "offensive" insofar as one could hang armed Israel paratroopers on them). An Israel invasion of Iraq seems unlikely. Iraqi weapons can obviously only be used offensively i.e. against the Kurds, or the Israelis in the Jordan Valley or, one day, if general war again breaks out and the Iraqis join in. But for the moment I would have thought that the Israelis would only worry about the types of weapon for immediate use, such as I have described above. If the deal were really large enough and meant a big switch from cheap Russian arms to expensive British ones, we could point out to the Israelis that the conversion problem would probably put the Iraqis out of action for several years.

5. Speaking broadly, I would have thought what really worries the Israelis at the moment is their own aircraft situation. Despite their superiority in morale and technology they cannot but be impressed by the sheer weight of materiel supplied to the Arab Air Forces since the June War compared with their own lack of numbers, complicated as it is by the spare parts situation arising from the French embargo. They are also aware of the very small number of trained Arab pilots who were put out of action in 1967. They may feel happier when the "Phantoms" begin to arrive, but for the next two years they will be, or purport to be, very worried about the credibility of their air

/"deterrent"

SECRET



SECRET



"deterrent". To this extent the American "Phantom" deal has been beneficial. Without it the Israelis would have been very inclined to put the wheels in motion for producing an unconventional deterrent of their own.

6. I am sending copies of this letter to Trevor Evans and to H.M. Representatives at Cairo, Bahrain Residency, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Kuwait, UKMIS New York and Washington.

*Yours ever*

*Michael*

(Michael Hadow)

*14/11/44*  
*24(2)*

SECRET



Near Eastern Dept-

With the Compliments of

C. B. BENJAMIN

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No. 15

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

EIRI(a)

NEQ 10/1

Ref. to be with orig  
Yelmin Papers.

PLUMA 12/2



~~Mr. Arthur:~~

I agree that we cannot at present say more is Mr. Hadow than is in the draft letter.

Mr. TrippArms for Iraq

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES NO. 1 24 MAR 1969
NEQ 10/1

(45)

20.3

Flag A

Mr. Hadow's letter 10/3 of 11 March to Mr. Arthur. Mr. Hadow makes a very valid point. Any benefit which may accrue from our supply of arms to Arab countries would be more than wiped out if as a result of this supply we are enforced to increase deliveries, possibly of new categories of arms, to Israel. This applies particularly to aircraft.

2. At the same time we must maintain our basic position that we cannot decide in advance of a firm order whether or not a particular weapon can be supplied. The situation both in the Middle East and in the relative balance of arms changes comparatively quickly and we would be wrong to make decisions on hypothetical cases.

3. Although the Iraqis have certainly shown an interest in Lightnings they have not yet put in any firm request. They may well not do so. We can only promise to take Mr. Hadow's point very carefully into account when requests of this kind are made.

4. There is thus not much to say in reply but I attach a short draft which may be worth sending.

A. A. Acland

(A. A. Acland)  
19 March, 1969

20  
3

14 March  
24/2



20 March, 1969.

NEQ 10/1

Arms for Iraq

(45)

Thank you for your letter 10/3 of 11 March. You described the whole arms business as a "terrible headache". That is an understatement.

2. As regards the particular question of aircraft for Iraq, the position is that no firm order has yet been placed although, as you know, a good deal of interest has been shown in Lightnings.

3. It is impossible when dealing with the tangled problem of arms supplies to comment on hypothetical situations. All I can promise is that the important considerations which you set out in your letter will be carefully taken into account whenever firm requests are put in. I do not underestimate the pressures which would build up in favour of supplying aircraft to Israel if we make deliveries to some Arab regimes, notably Iraq, U.A.R. or Syria (the last two are pretty unlikely customers.). I am sure that we must try to avoid becoming a supplier of aircraft to Israel. Tanks are bad enough. If the supply of Lightnings to Iraq were likely to lead to our being asked to supply aircraft to Israel then we would have to think very carefully indeed before agreeing; otherwise, "the last state ..... would be worse than the first". I think that Trevor Evans would agree with this although I know that in principle and in the context of Anglo/Iraqi relations he is keen on our supplying arms to Iraq.

4. Conversely, of course, if we ever did supply aircraft to Israel, we should have to do our best to flog the same aircraft to every Arab in sight. This is no doubt what many people in Whitehall would like, but it is not easy to do, for in crucial cases the "security" bogey is raised. I can only say, reverting to the first paragraph, that anybody who had my job would very soon find himself wishing, as I do, that we did not make the damned things at all.

(G. G. ARTHUR)

Michael Hadow Esq., C.M.G.,  
TEL AVIV.

P. 1/1111  
24/3

c.c. H.M. Representatives at Baghdad, Cairo, Bahrain, Beirut,  
Amman, Jedda, Kuwait, UKMIS New York and Washington.

**SECRET**




Confidential  
~~TOP SECRET~~

48

New Eastern Dept.

A.W.P. Meeting 25<sup>Feb</sup> Apr 69



(xii) Supply of Lightning and Red Top to Iraq

CONFIDENTIAL

THE CHAIRMAN asked what progress had been made in preparing a revised paper for submission to the ESC(O). MR SAVIGAR said the Ministry of Technology were considering the manner in which the new paper could best be presented and it was hoped that it would be available in the near future. He also said that the production line had reached a crucial stage. It was hoped to feed in more export orders, otherwise the line would soon come to an end and future orders would, of course, cost considerably more.

THE WORKING PARTY:-

INVITED the Ministry of Technology to circulate the revised paper in due course.

note

Inspect Benjamin, Mr Tech who is responsible of the coordination of the paper and we agreed that no circulation would be possible until the Iraqi attitude to the purchase of lightnings was clear - the enclosed may constitute it to submit a 4 lines in late April.

pa. PNMH  
27/5.

Confidential  
~~TOP SECRET~~



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**DRAFT \*CABLE / SAVINGRAM**

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Date &  
T.O.D.

28. 3. 69

Serial No.

STOW 10.

\*No objection to teleprinter if available

ORIGINATING OFFICER(Name) C. B. BENJAMINRank PRINCIPALBranch EIR/1(a)Building STUART HOUSERoom 305 Ext. 105Date 28th MARCH, 1969COUNTERSIGNED

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Rank PRINCIPALBranch EIR/1(a)Date 28th MARCH, 1969DISTRIBUTION :-

Originator

EIR/1(a)INFORMATION COPIES TO :-FCO (EASTERN DEPARTMENT)B.O.T.EIR2

File No.

AP/77/05

†Priority marking:

ROUTINE

TO :

BAGHDAD

FOR :

FROM : EIR/1(a), MINTECHTEXT (use double spacing for cables)YOUR STOW 7? OF 15 MARCH.SUBJECT: LIGHTNINGS

MESSAGE PASSED TO BAC. HOBDAV

HAS NO OTHER COMMITMENTS FOR A  
MONTH OR SO, AND READY TO VISIT

YOU AT ANY TIME

RECEIVED IN  
ARCHIVES No.15

31 MAR 1969

NEQ 10/1

Reg &amp; ca.

PMH

31/3.

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX


\*Delete as appropriate



ref 'X'  
SECRET

This must be taken into account if & when the Israelis put in a bid for Lightning.

(50)



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
TEL AVIV

1 April, 1969

(10/3)

cd. Nae again  
with repr. pl

in Hinchcliffe  
in Mages o.v. Mr. Tapp. 8.4.  
Mr. Adams 8.4.

Dear Geoffrey,

P.A. 14/4

Arms for Iraq

(47)

Please refer to your letter of 20 March.

2. Just so there should be no misunderstanding, the point I was trying to make was that there was only likely to be a sharp Israel reaction if we sold aircraft to Iraq of a type the Israelis wanted, but which we had refused them. Lightnings do not come into this category as the Israelis have never wanted them. Indeed General Weizmann, who was then head of the I.A.F., told me once in 1966 that he wouldn't take a Lightning even if it were given away free with a packet of tea.

3. I realise that the mere sale of Lightnings to Iraq might lead to some uninformed pressures in the United Kingdom to sell Israel "aircraft" as well. I must leave it to you to estimate how serious this pressure would be. If a Lightning deal with Iraq could be brought off now, we could argue that Hunters (the only aircraft that the Israelis are interested in as a stopgap) are not available. The question of Harriers would only come up later and we might then be in a position to offer to sell small quantities of this very expensive gadget to any Arab state which wanted it as well as to Israel.

4. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

Yours ever  
Michael.

(Michael Hadow)

G. G. Arthur, Esq., C.M.G.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London S.W.1.

SECRET

They are not, in fact - being now scrapped.  
Adams

'X' //



Security Classification : CONFIDENTIAL

# DRAFT \*CABLE / SAVINGRAM

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R.131 NEQ

FOR O.S.(Tels)2 USE ONLY	
Date & T.O.D.	<u>14/4/69</u> <u>98543</u> (5)
Serial No.	<u>STOW</u> <u>REGISTRY</u> <u>16 APR 1969</u>

\*No objection to teleprinter if available

## ORIGINATING OFFICER

(Name) J.P. SHEEN  
Rank H.E.O.  
Branch EIR 1(a)  
Building Stuart House  
Room 304 Ext. 103  
Date 14th April 1969

## COUNTERSIGNED

Signed [Signature]  
Rank H.E.O.  
Branch EIR 1(a)  
Date 14th April 1969  
BAGHDAD

## DISTRIBUTION :-

Originator STOW O/N  
mtel to BEIRUT  
EIR 1(a)

## INFORMATION COPIES TO :-

US/EIR  
AS/EIR 1  
N.E. Dept., ECO  
Air A2(b)  
MOD Navy  
MOD Army

File No. AP/99/08

†Priority marking: ROUTINE  
TO : BAGHDAD  
FOR : Britdefat repeat Britdefat Beirut  
FROM : EIR 1(a) Mintech

TEXT (use double spacing for cables)

Subject: Britdefat Beirut telegram

OFZ/OYT/STOW/095 of 10th April.

Westlands report they are currently following up an 'Iraqi Air Force' requirement for 6 repeat 6 helicopters of which you are aware. They are puzzled by Britdefat Beirut reference to an Iraqi Customs requirement for 6 helicopters and suspect that it is the same requirement. They do not wish to open up a second channel through BAUJI unnecessarily.

Grateful for your advice.

†See Handbook of Office Procedure, Chapter IX

\*Delete as appropriate

Copy to the Admiral  
lbn reg + m  
PMMH  
15/4



52

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. TO -2 MAY 1969 NEQ 10/1
---

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CYPHER/CATA

ROUTINE BEIRUT

TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM NUMBER OFZ/OYT/STOW/FOH/113 020630Z MAY 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

See (51)

ADDRESSED TO MINTECH, BAGHDAD, MOD NAVY, MOD ARMY REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO MOD UK.

OFZ/OYT/STOW/FOH/113 020630Z MAY PD  
FROM DA BEIRUT PD REF BAGHDAD TELEGRAM OF 240905Z APR PD BAUJI  
VITUALLY CERTAIN THAT CUSTOMS HELICOPTER REQUIREMENT SEPARATE  
FROM IAF PD REQUESTS WESTLANDS TELEGRAPH HIM APPROX PRICES PD  
BAUJI MAY VISIT UK NEXT WEEK RE LAUNCHES AND I WILL ADVISE HIM  
TO TELEPHONE JONES OF WESTLANDS DIRECT.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS TO MINTECH, BAGHDAD, MOD NAVY, MOD ARMY AND  
MOD UK.

MR.KING

[SENT TO D.C.C. AND MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY]

REPEATED AS REQUESTED.

FILES  
NEAR EASTERN DEPT

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*[Handwritten signature]*  
18/5



CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELEGRAM STOW UNNUMBERED 7 MAY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 12 MAY 1969 NEQ 10/1
---

FOR MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY FROM DEFAT TELNO KBV 070635Z MAY.  
FOR EIR 1(AA).

REF STOW 12 OF 15 APRIL.

PARIS AIR SHOW. ACTING AIR FORCE COMMANDER BRIGADIER  
MOHAMMAD NAJR AL KISSAR TELLS ME THAT HE HAS BEEN GRANTED PERMISSION  
TO GO TO SHOW BUT DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER ANYONE ELSE WILL ACCOMPANY  
HIM.

2. KISSAR FURTHER SAID THAT HE INTENDED GOING ON TO U.K. BY RAIL  
AND SEA FOR A SHORT VISIT. AN OFFER OF A FREE FLIGHT WOULD BE VERY  
ACCEPTABLE.

3. SUGGEST THAT INVITATIONS ARE SENT TO BRIGADIER KISSAR PLUS  
THREE BLANK CARDS.

4. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE: AIR LT. GEN. HARDAN ABDUL GHAFAR AL  
TIKRITI, HAS INDICATED THAT HE MIGHT BE IN EUROPE AT TIME OF  
SHOW AND RECOMMEND STRONGLY THAT HE BE INVITED TOGETHER WITH HIS  
PERSONAL STAFF OFFICER AIR LT. COL. FAHIM JALAL ABDUL RAZZAQ.

4. DIRECTOR OF IRAQI FLYING CLUB, MR. AZZIZ AL ANI, AT PRESENT  
BUYING BEAGLE PUPS MIGHT ALSO APPRECIATE INVITATION AS WOULD  
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION (ABDUL HAQQ AL AJILI).

MR. EVANS

/SENT TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY/

STOW DISTRIBUTION  
NEAR EASTERN DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN



Reference.....

Mr ~~Aland~~,So the free flight is  
for BAC not HMA to  
take up. ~~AM~~ 9/5

I saw telegram below.

The invitations to the Paris Air  
Show are from B.A.C. who are  
exhibiting British aircraft there.  
As Kuzov will be in Paris and  
probably coming to the U.K. on a  
private visit anyway it is thought  
that BAC might be interested in  
earning extra funds of goodwill  
by paying his air ticket to here and  
possibly giving him some hospitality  
while he is in this country.

This information is from Min. Tech.

Pa 11/15 PRM/Humble 9/5



CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A  
PRIORITY BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 456

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
15 MAY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO. 456 OF 14 MAY R F I MINTECH ( BENJEMIN EIR(2) ) AND CRED/B O T( FOR SINCLAIR .)

REL.
REGISTERED
15 MAY 1969
NEQ 10/1

### ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

HOBDAV OF B A C HAD A MEETING LASTING OVER AN HOUR WITH GENERAL HARDAN TIKRITI ON 12 MAY. TIKRITI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(A) IRAQ WANTS TO PURCHASE LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM. HER REQUIREMENTS INCLUDE AIRCRAFT, RADAR AND EQUIPMENT OF ALL KINDS, INCLUDING SAM MISSILES AND PATROL BOATS FOR THE NAVY-

(B) IRAQ SPECIFICALLY WANTED TO BUY:(TABULATE FOLLOWING UNDER TWO HEADINGS QUOTE ITEM UNQUOTE AND QUOTE APPROXIMATE VALUE UNQUOTE)

(1) TWO SQUADRONS OF LIGHTNINGS WITH SPARES ETC.....£52M.

(2) TWO SQUADRONS OF JAGUAR WITH SPARES ETC...£47M.

(3) TWO SQUADRONS OF BAC 167 WITH SPARES ETC.....£8M.

TOTAL £107 MILLION.

IN ADDITION THEY WANT RADAR AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FROM MARCONI AND POSSIBLY RAPIER. THIS (GP UNDEC ? MIGHT)AMOUNT TO A FURTHER £20M.

(C) IRAQ WOULD LIKE THE U K TO PROVIDE LARGE SCALE TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT-

(D) IRAQ WISHES TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE WEST AND REQUIRES WESTERN SUPPORT. HER TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH BRITAIN COULD FLOWER AGAIN IF H M G WOULD HELP IN SORTING OUT IRAQ'S PROBLEMS WITH THE I P C AND OTHERWISE SHOW A SERIOUS INTENTION TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. IRAQ IS NOT A COMMUNIST COUNTRY AND THE IRAQIS DO NOT FAVOUR COMMUNISM-

/(E) HE

CONFIDENTIAL



(E) HE NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF H M G IN RESOLVING POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. IF HE COULD BE SURE OF RETURNING FROM A VISIT TO LONDON WITH QUOTE SOMETHING IN HIS HAND UNQUOTE HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY ORDER MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT IRAQ REQUIRED-

(F) THE DANGER OF H M G'S PRESENT COOL ATTITUDE IS THAT IRAQ MAY BE COMPELLED AGAIN TO BUY FROM RUSSIA ON ACCOUNT OF CHEAP PRICES AND PRESSURES FROM WITHIN THE BA'ATH PARTY. IRAQ HAS BEEN PROMISED MIG23S ON FAVOURABLE TERMS AS THE PRICE OF RECOGNITION OF THE G D R. IRAQ HOWEVER, SHOULD BE LESS DEPENDENT ON THE U S S R FOR ARMS PARTICULARLY AS THEY HAVE NOT BEEN PLEASED WITH PAST SUPPORT-

(G) HE AND HIS STAFF HAVE BEEN INVITED TO MOSCOW AT THE END OF (GP UNDEC) TO EVALUATE THE MIG23. IF THIS MATCHES UP TO IRAQ'S REQUIREMENTS IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE IRAQI AIR FORCE TO REFUSE IT, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD PREFER TO HAVE BRITISH EQUIPMENT. A MIG 23 PURCHASE WOULD PUT PAID TO ANY PROSPECT OF ANY LIGHTNING OR JAGUAR SALE.

(H) HE HOPES THAT B A C WILL DO EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER TO ASSIST A STRENGTHENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND H M G. ANY SIGNS ON OFFICIAL INTEREST WILL BE WELCOME. (HE PARTICULARLY MENTIONED THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTH REINSTATING THE COMET MISSION URGENTLY).

2. HOBDAV IS GREATLY IMPRESSED BY THE POSSIBILITIES OF VERY LARGE SCALE ORDERS HERE AND CONSIDERS THAT, GIVEN THE RIGHT CONDITIONS, THERE COULD BE CONTRACTS FOR B A C AND OTHER BRITISH FIRMS ON THE SAME SCALE AS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND LIBYA.

3. MINTECH PLEASE PASS TO H.R. BAXENDALE  
B A C PRESTON DIVISION.

4. PLEASE SEE MY TWO I F T.

F C O PASS CRED/BOT AND MINTECH.

MR. HAWLEY

[PASSED TO MINTECH AND  
BOARD OF TRADE]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. EAST. DEPT.

D.T.S.D.

DEF. POL. DEPT.

M.O.D. (INTERNAL)

FFFFF

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CYPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NO 457

SECRET

TOP COPY (55)

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
14 MAY 1969

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 16 MAY 1969 NEQ 10/1
---

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO. 457 OF 14 MAY R F I MINTECH (FOR BENJAMIN EIR2.) AND CRW/BOT (FOR SINCLAIR.)

M I P T : ARMS FOR IRAQ.

TAKRITI SENT HUSSOUN, AN-INTERMEDIARY HE HAS PREVIOUSLY USED, TO SEE HOBDAV AGAIN ON 13 MAY TO REINFORCE THE POINTS MADE AT THE MEETING ON 12 MAY. THE NEED FOR AN I P C SETTLEMENT WAS AGAIN STRESSED BUT NOTHING NEW WAS BROUGHT UP EXCEPT THAT

(A) IF THE MIG 23 DEAL IS TO BE FOILED, SWIFT ACTION IS REQUIRED, AND

(B) TAKRITI MAY NOT BE GOING TO MOSCOW QUITE SO EARLY AS HE TOLD HOBDAV.

F C O PASS MINTECH AND CRED/BOT.

MR. HAWLEY / PASSED TO MINTECH & B.O.T. /

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
NEAR EASTERN DEPT.  
DEFENCE POLICY DEPT.  
D.T. & S.D.  
M.O.D. (INTERNAL)

Action less lat  
m

NEQ 10/12.

Pa PMM

2/15

SECRET

XXXXXX



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

W(B)L 51-7433

Registry No.	DRAFT Letter	Type 1 +
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	To:—	From
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.	Michael Hadow, <sup>Esq</sup> CMG, Tel Aviv.	G.G. Arthur
PRIVACY MARKING	<i>Secret</i>	Telephone No. & Ext.
In Confidence		Department
c.c. HM Representatives	<u>Arms for Iraq</u>	
Baghdad Cairo Bahrain Beirut Amman Jedda Kuwait UKMIS New York Washington	<p>Thank you for your letter 10/3 of 11 March.</p> <p>You described the whole arms business as a "terrible headache". <sup>That</sup> <del>This</del> is an understatement.</p> <p>2. As regards the particular question of aircraft for Iraq, the position is that no firm order has yet been placed although, as you know, a good deal of interest has been shown in Lightnings.</p> <p>3. It is impossible when dealing with the tangled problem of arms supplies to comment on hypothetical situations. All I can promise is that the important considerations which you set out in your letter will be very carefully taken into account whenever firm requests are put in. I do not underestimate the pressures which would build up in favour of supplying aircraft to Israel if we make deliveries to some Arab regimes, notably Iraq, UAR or Syria. I am quite sure in my own <del>mind</del> <sup>try to</sup> that we must avoid becoming a supplier of aircraft to Israel. Tanks are bad enough. If the supply of Lightnings <sup>(on being asked to supply)</sup> <del>to Iraq</del> <sup>and aircraft is</sup> <del>to Iraq</del> were likely to lead <del>to this</del> then we would have to think very carefully indeed before agreeing; otherwise, "the last state <del>of affairs</del> would be worse than the first".</p>	


(The last two are pretty unlikely customers!).

/I



I think that Trefor Evans would agree with this although I know that in principle ~~and~~ in the context of Anglo/Iraqi relations he is keen on our supplying arms to Iraq.

4. Conversely, of course, if we ever did supply aircraft to Israel, we should have to do our best to fly the same aircraft to every Arab in sight. This is no doubt what many people in Whitehall would like, but it is not easy to do, for in crucial cases the "security" bogen is raised. I can only say, ~~for~~ reverting to the first paragraph, that anybody who had my job would very soon find himself wishing ~~to~~, as I do, that we did not make the damned things at all.


  
3.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



Reference. NEQ 10/1

~~Mr. Acland~~  
~~Mr. MacRae~~



Reg 10/1  
 P.M.M.  
 u/s

Arms for Iraq

I am engaged, as you know in drafting a Blue Minute and a draft telegram in reply to the three telegrams from Baghdad.

2. You will have seen references to Takriti's "fears" that he may be pressured into buying MIG 23s. I understand from the assessment staff, and this is confirmed by DI4, that MIG 23s are only in experimental use with the Russians - not even in service with their own forces and that they (the Russians) have no intention of supplying them to anyone (including Warsaw Pact countries) for a number of years. It is unlikely that Iraq would be given special consideration in this case!

3. Almost certainly Takriti is (probably in all innocence as other Arabs have recently made the same error) referring to an up-dated version of the MIG 21 which has basically the same performance as the old 21 but with more sophisticated electronic equipment including more efficient radar.

4. I understand that the Lightning is a better aircraft for Iraqi purposes (defence against Israeli fighters?) than the updated MIG 21 but it is **true** that the Russians could offer the MIG at a much lower cost than we could afford to sell the Lightning.

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)

20 May 1969

c.c. NEQ 10/2

Mr. Hinchcliffe.

It is probably the updated version of the MIG 21, but this shows how imprecise and uninformed many of the Iraqi requests for arms are.

DI5. confirmed this this afternoon. 19/5  
 that the MIG 23 is far beyond an updated MIG 21, and that Takriti is certainly mis-informed.

Adrian 20/5



PRIORITY

GYPHER/CAT A

57

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NO FOH/FTH 201500Z

TO MOD UK

20 MAY 1969.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
22 MAY 1969  
NEQ 10/1

SECRET.

22/5  
Huzzah!  
Mr A. C. ...  
The Penny  
dropped!  
21/5

FOLLOWING FOR MOD. UK TEL NO FOH/FTH 201500Z MAY 69  
FROM DA BAGHDAD.

Distribution to  
MOD. (3)  
Hd. of Defence Policy Dept.  
Defence Policy Dept.  
Defence Training & Supply Dept.  
Hd. of P. U. S. D.  
P. U. S. D.  
Military Staff  
... Mr. Easton Dept.  
Hd. of Comms. Dept.  
Examiners  
File: Distribution Selectors.  
Inform Registrar

ATTENTION SQN LDR CARDWELL.

REFERENCE YOUR FOH 191442Z MAY.

UNDERSTAND AIRCRAFT NAMED MIG 23 (TWENTY THREE)  
BY IRAQIS. FRENCH AIR ATTACHE HERE SAYS IT IS THE MIG 21  
(M) (TWENTY ONE MIKE). NO DESCRIPTION OR PICTURE AVAIL-  
ABLE BUT ASSUME AIRCRAFT TO BE COMPARABLE WITH LIGHTNING,  
GROUND ATTACK VERSION. IT IS VITAL THAT THE INFORMATION  
REQUESTED IN MY FOH/FTH 150710Z MAY REACHES US BY FRIDAY  
23 MAY AT LATEST. IRAQI TEAM LEAVING HERE FOR MOSCOW 26  
MAY AND TIME IS REQUIRED TO MAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PASS  
THE INFORMATION TO THEM DISCREETLY.

MORE INFORMATION MAY BE AVAILABLE FROM MR HOBDAY  
OF BAC WARTON.

SENT TO D.C.C.

SENT 0600Z/21 MAY

RECD 0804Z/21 MAY

EVANS



58

See also 53.

CYPHER CAT A

**PRIORITY**

**NO COPIES MADE**

MOD (UK)

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER

29 MAY 1969

WWW/KBV 290850Z

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
30 MAY 1969  
NEQ 10/1

Distribution to  
M.O.D. (3)  
Hd. of Defence Policy Dept.  
Defence Policy Dept.  
Defence Training & Supply Dept  
Hd. of P.U.S.D.  
P.U.S.D.  
Military Staff  
N. Easter Dept.  
Hd. of Comms. Dept.  
Examiners  
File: Distribution Selectors.  
Inform Registrar.

RESTRICTED

FM DEFAT BAGHDAD TEL MODUK TELNO WWW/KBV 290850Z/MAY 69

0  
FVR BERGER ODR FROM SHARPE. FURTHER TO MY DO/4/11/39  
DATED 24 MAY. DELEGATION NOW CONSISTS OF KISSAR AND FOUN.  
ARRIVES LONDON BY AIR FRANCE 1630 LOCAL ON 8 JUNE AND LEAVES  
12TH OR 13TH. DETAILS KNOWN TO IRAQI AA IN LONDON.  
GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD CONTACT HIM AND ADVISE INTERESTED PARTIES.

KTRDS/

SENT TO D. C.

Reg to PA.  
with  
P. M. M.  
Covered  
400  
P. M. M.  
21/5

EVANS

SENT 291500Z MAY 1969

RECD 291544Z MAY 1969




(59)

KNIGHTSBRIDGE 7141-6

EMBASSY OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ

21, QUEEN'S GATE,  
LONDON, S.W.7.



The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to inform it of the arrival in this country on 6th. June, 1969, of Brigadier Mohammed Nasser Al-Kassar of the Iraqi Air Force and Colonel Fadhil Yassin for a period of about one week for discussions on aircraft spare parts. The Embassy would be grateful for any help that could be given to Brigadier Al-Kassar and Colonel Yassin during their stay.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq avails itself of this opportunity to renew to Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurance of its highest consideration.

London, 22nd. May, 1969



Her Majesty's Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 4/8  
London S.W.1.



CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

TELNO STOW 23

12 JUNE 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 10/1

60

ADDRESSED TO MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY TELNO STOW 23 OF 12 JUNE.  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FCO.

AS/WEIR 2 FOR GAMMON FROM BRITAIRATT BAGHDAD.

IRAQI AIR FORCE URGENTLY REQUIRE CARTRIDGES FOR HUNTER SINGLE  
AND TWO SEAT AIRCRAFT TO FIT EJECTOR SEATS. CANOPIES AND EJECTOR  
RELEASE UNITS.

2. IRAQI AIR ATTACHE LONDON GETTING NO RESPONSE TO HIS PLEADING.  
BECAUSE OF UNSATISFACTORY REPLIES FROM INDUSTRY, IRAQ MINISTRY OF  
DEFENCE SUSPECT SPARES BEING WITHHELD PURPOSELY. UNDERSTAND ITEMS  
IN SHORT SUPPLY BUT FAILURE TO RESPOND PLACES US IN SAME CATEGORY  
AS OTHER NATIONS WITH BAD AFTER SALES SERVICE.

3. ILL FEELINGS WILL BE CAUSED BY ANY FURTHER DELAY AND MAY DAMAGE  
OTHER SALES PROSPECTS.

4. IN THIS URGENT CASE, CAN ITEMS BE BORROWED FROM RAF. FULL  
ORDER AS FOLLOWS, BUT ANY PART OF ORDER HOWEVER SMALL WOULD EASE  
SITUATION CONSIDERABLY.

QUANTITY 12

PART NO. 12K/1405, QTY 150 OF 12K/1403, QTY 100 OF 12K/1396,  
QTY 60 OF 12K/1397, QTY 12 OF 12K/1399, QTY 120 OF 12K/1348,  
QTY 50 OF 12K/1248 (2 PINS).

MR. EVANS

STOW DISTRIBUTION  
N. EASTERN D.  
DEF. TR. & S.D.

MINTECH ARE  
REQUIRE  
DIRECT.

PA  
PMM

VLP

QQQQQ

CONFIDENTIAL





Neve Eastern Dept

P.R.M. HINGHCLIFFE. (175)

BOARD OF TRADE

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY  
26 JUN 1969  
NEQ 61

Export Licensing Branch

Hillgate House, 35, Old Bailey, LONDON E.C.4.

Telephone: 01-248 5757, ext. 4080

Our Reference:

Your Reference:

Export Licence Application No.

10/3601/69

Attached is a copy of particulars of an application to  
export goods controlled under legislation at present in force.

Is there any objection to the issue of a licence in this  
case please?

Signed

Date

CC

23/6/69

Referred to:-

- Admiralty
- Ministry of Technology
- ✓ Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office
- ✓ War Office
- ✓ Ministry of Defence
- Air Ministry
- Board of Trade, General Division.

Regy

Please attend  
a copy of this  
to the telegrams  
on the subject

0.6

PNM

DSR 20

immed.

27/5

These do  
not appear  
to be the  
same items  
mentioned in the  
tels. The  
ref. numbers  
are different.

30/6

F.O.





ID/3601/69

HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION LIMITED.,  
RICHMOND ROAD, KINGSTON UPON THAMES.  
SURREY.

NONE

These items are required for Hunter  
Aircraft already exported with approv-  
al of Dept. E.I.R.(a) Ministry of Defence

  
H. Burdage.

CS. 60/63

Deputy Contracts Manager  
(Kingston and Hamble)  
19th June, 1969.

CT/9.2/JET/C.191/69:

Hawker Siddeley  
Aviation Limited.,  
Richmond Road,  
Kingston upon Thames. Surrey.

Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd.,  
Richmond Road,  
Kingston upon Thames,  
Surrey.

IRAQ.

80                      12K/1411              Cartridges No. 1. Mark 3.              £380. -- --.

For Hunter Aircraft Ejection

Seats.

Consignee: Iraqi Air Force,  
Ministry of Defence,  
Baghdad, Iraq.

£380. -- --.



CYPHER/CAT A

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
TOP COPY (61)

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 540

12 JUNE 1969



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(60)

MY TELNO STOW 23 TO MINTECH. EJECTOR SEAT CARTRIDGES FOR HUNTERS.

THIS CRI DE COEUR IS THE RESULT OF AN APPEAL FROM GENERAL TAKRITI TO MY AIR ATTACHE. I AM MYSELF SEEING GENERAL TAKRITI ON 14 JUNE AND HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HE WILL REVERT TO THE CHARGE. OUR CHANCES OF SECURING FURTHER ORDERS FOR MILITARY AIRCRAFT FROM THE IRAQI AIR FORCE MAY WELL DEPEND ON OUR ABILITY TO MEET REQUESTS SUCH AS THIS. I TRUST YOU FEEL ABLE TO URGE BOTH THE MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY TO APPROACH THE MANUFACTURERS CONCERNED, IF NECESSARY, AND ALSO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (AIR) WITH A VIEW TO A LIMITED NUMBER OF CARTRIDGES BEING MADE AVAILABLE BY THE RAF AS A TEMPORARY MEASURE.

MR. EVANS

FILES  
NEAR EASTERN DEPT.  
D.T. & S.D.  
DEFENCE POLICY DEPT.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

See memo (60)  
re all  
13/6 -

xxxxxx

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Reference

RECEIVED IN REGISTER NO. 13 16 JUN 1969 NEQ 10/1
---

Mr. AclandEjector Seat Cartridges for IraqiHunters

--- Please see telegram No. 540 from Baghdad attached below.

2. I have been on to Min. Tech. and they are looking into the problem as a matter of urgency. The situation is complicated, slightly, by the fact that telegram STOW 23 has not yet arrived.

3. I understand from Min. Tech. that in the middle of May the Iraqi Military Attache asked for tenders to be submitted for these cartridges with a closing date of 22 June. The main British firm making this item, Martin Baker Limited, have quoted, giving a delivery time of four to six weeks. As it is ~~until~~ 12 June it is reasonable to assume that the Iraqi Embassy has not yet placed a firm order and obviously there are lines crossed between the Embassy and Hardan Takriti's staff in Baghdad.

4. The Iraqi Air Force Commander and his staff who are at present in the United Kingdom are discussing with Min. Tech. and the firms concerned spare parts for Hunters and I understand that these include ejector seat cartridges which have suddenly become so urgent.

5. The Ministry of Technology will be replying directly to STOW 23 (when it arrives) and when I know what the exact position is, we might consider sending a parallel telegram.



(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)  
12 June, 1969.

Stow 23 now received.

I think we should be following up about this if we can. It is basically after sales service.

*[Handwritten signature]* 12/6

*[Handwritten signature]* Hinchcliffe

Reg. sa.  
*[Handwritten signature]* 12/6



ROUTINE: STOW 25 SENT 16.6.69

TO: PRODROME BAGHDAD

FOR: AIR ATTACHE

FROM: MINTECH, EIR 2A, LONDON

RESTRICTED

63

REC
16 JUN 1969
NEQ 10/1

OUR STOW DATED 13TH JUNE (POWER CARTRIDGES). (EXTERNAL SENS FOR 12001 AMALC)

1. PRICE FROM RAF STOCKS OF 12K/1248 IS £5.5s.0d. EACH. QUANTITY

50 EARMARKED.

2. HAVE TODAY ALSO SPOKEN TO MANUFACTURERS, GRAVINER LTD.

THEY CONFIRM NO PROBLEMS ON SUPPLY BUT HAVE HAD NO (REPEAT NO)

RECENT ORDERS OR ENQUIRIES FROM IRAQ AIR FORCE.

ORIG:- EIR 2A

INFO:- US/EIR

AS/EIR 2

EIR 1A

DS 8(AIR) MOD

SALES 1(A) ARMY (MOD)

FCO DTSD - ARABIAN DEPT.

FILE NO:- HU/423/03  
HU/423/01

Reg & r.a  
PUMA  
17/6



64

Pa  
PWA  
1/7

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ODR 704/4/1

REPORT ON  
VISIT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM BY  
BRIGADIER MOHAMMAD NASR AL-KASSAR  
ACTING COMMANDER IRAQI AIR FORCE  
JUNE 1969

1. Brigadier Mohammad Nasr Al-Kassar, the Acting Commander of the Iraqi Air Force paid a private visit to Britain from the 8th-13th June 1969 as the guest of the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) by whom he and his party\* were lodged at the Royal Garden Hotel.
2. The Iraqis have shown an interest in the Lightning during the past two years and following his visit to Baghdad in May 1969, Mr. Hobday of BAC believed that General Hardan Takriti, Minister of Defence (and Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the Air Force), wished to place orders, not only for the Lightning, but for the Jaguar and BAC 167, and for guided weapons and radar, provided HMG were to make some gesture to Iraq such as an offer to sell the Lightning. The purpose of his invitation to Brigadier Kassar was, therefore, to further the sale of BAC equipment.
3. Before coming to Britain the Iraqi mission visited the Paris Air Show and, as is usual with such delegations, there was uncertainty as to the time of their arrival until they reached London. Despite shadowing by BAC in Paris (who assured us they were arriving on Monday 9th June) and our requests for information to the Iraqi Embassy in London (from whom we heard nothing either before or during the visit), Brigadier Kassar arrived a day earlier than expected on Sunday 8th June. The programme is at Appendix.
4. When Brigadier Kassar called on VCAS he asked for more training facilities for members of the Iraqi Air Force and in particular, basic training, additional places at the Central Flying School for Instructors, Staff College, Fighter Controllers and Navigation Courses. VCAS replied that we wished to be helpful but that we were at present scaling down our capacity, and many branches had to be consulted before a final decision could be given. However, we always endeavoured to provide the training required for any equipment purchased in the United Kingdom.
5. During his call on ACAS(Ops), Brigadier Kassar asked for information about the Harrier in which he appeared to show a personal interest, but on which he clearly had precious little idea as to its role and capabilities.

/(This

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\* He was accompanied by:

Lt Col Fadhil Yassin, Director Iraqi Air Force Technical Supply

Major Tahir Al Takriti, Personal Staff Adviser to the Minister of Defence at  
 Iraqi Air Force Headquarters

Major Adil Sulaiman, Commander Hunter Squadron.

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(This was surprising since an Iraqi Air Force Delegation which visited Britain at the time of the Farnborough Air Show 1968 cancelled a visit to Hawker Siddeley Aviation at Dunsfold on the grounds that they already had all the necessary information on the Harrier.)

6. At the meeting in Ministry of Technology which was chaired by Mr. J.R. Christie, Under Secretary, Exports and International Relations he took the opportunity of explaining to the visitors the part played by his Division in the field of British exports and emphasised the advisory and non political character of its relationship with foreign armed forces. Brigadier Kassir raised a number of minor matters ranging from spares for Hunter aircraft to cartridges for ejector seats. No mention was made of the Lightning, nor indeed of an interest in any other British aircraft or equipment.

7. It is now necessary to refer to the behaviour of the mission and to the attitude which they displayed towards the official part of their programme. I have already referred (paragraph 3 above) to our lack of information about their arrival, although it subsequently transpired that the Iraqi Embassy had the details. The plan was for the Iraqi party to go to BAC Warton on 10th June, to Royal Air Force Station Leuchars on 12th June and to the Ministries of Defence and Technology on the 13th, before departure on the 14th. On Monday 9th June, I submitted to Brigadier Kassir the programme for calls at the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Technology followed by an official luncheon on Friday, 13th June, all of which he accepted. However, the evening of 9th June BAC informed the Ministry of Technology that Brigadier Kassir had cancelled his visit to RAF Leuchars on the grounds that he wished to have more time in London. I subsequently asked Mr. Glen Hobday (Special Director and Sales and Service Manager of the Preston Division) of BAC how the request (which we had received from the Ministry of Technology) for Brigadier Kassir to visit Royal Air Force Station Leuchars had arisen. He replied that during his visit to Baghdad in May last he had invited the Acting Air Force Commander to visit London and Warton as the guest of BAC. He had also suggested that he might wish to visit a Royal Air Force Station where he could see the Lightning in an operational environment to which Brigadier Kassir had readily acceded. It should however be recorded that this is not the first occasion on which guests of BAC have cancelled items in their official programmes. (On one occasion, Mr. Brown of BAC boasted that he would, and he succeeded in preventing guests of HMG from keeping an appointment with another firm of aircraft manufacturers.)

8. On 12th June Mr. Ian Brown of BAC informed me that Brigadier Kassir would not be able to keep his appointment with the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, his meeting in the Ministry of Technology or the luncheon hosted by Mr. Christie, US/EIR of that Ministry. The Chief of the Iraqi General Staff was arriving in London that day on a private visit and Brigadier Kassir had decided that he would meet him at London Airport. I pointed out to Mr. Brown that the Iraqis had already cancelled a visit at short notice to an RAF station and that if they were now to cancel their official programme on the 13th, this would create a very bad impression in Whitehall. If Brigadier Kassir had a valid reason why he could not keep the appointment, I hoped that he, Brown, would

/suggest



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○ suggest to him that he communicate direct with me at the Ministry of Defence. If he had no valid reason, and as he was the guest of BAC and I expected him (Brown) to have his guest on parade. I also saw Brigadier Kassar myself the same evening and when it was clear that he was still undecided what he would do on the 13th ie the following day, I asked him if General Hamadi Shihab, Chief of the General Staff would not wish him to keep his official appointments on the 13th. However, the decision must be his, and if he was unable to call at the Ministries and keep his luncheon appointment, perhaps he would wish me to convey some message to Air Marshal Sir Peter Fletcher. Kassar replied somewhat reluctantly that he would stick to his programme.

9. I have described these incidents in some detail because I believe that the increasing frequency of such behaviour in recent years may lead to its acceptance as what we must expect in the world of today. There is a danger that such an admission, if it became generally accepted, could debase the currency of our official invitations to the detriment of our international relationships. In this connection Mr. Ian Brown's extraordinary attitude is not irrelevant when in conversation with me he made it clear that he considered it not unexceptional that Brigadier Kassar having accepted invitations from HMG should cancel them the day before on the grounds that the invitations were extended only on his arrival in the United Kingdom.

10. The cancellation of official visits by a foreign Chiefs of Staff at short notice not only causes unnecessary work (and possibly expense to the individual establishment) but the inevitable irritation which it engenders tends to militate against the very purpose of such visits. The damage is the greater when the cancellation is unaccompanied by even the semblance of an excuse or the whiff of an apology. Moreover, the effect of the threat of an unjustifiable cancellation which is subsequently put on again by the intervention of officials, can be almost as detrimental as a cancellation. It is not, of course, suggested that we should be inflexible. However, commercial firms, no doubt from the best motives, not infrequently attempt - and particularly at desk working level - to insist that such an action by HMG is essential to the success of a sale of national significance. It is perhaps particularly at such times that those of us responsible for the handling of visits should contact the visitor, if time permits through HBM Attache in the visitor's country before his departure, or through the commercial firm if one be the host and direct contact is not possible. If necessary the visitor should be left in no doubt that although his visit to a Ministry or Service establishment in the United Kingdom may have been requested on his behalf by a commercial firm, the invitation is issued in the name of HMG and the obligation to keep the appointment is therefore as binding as any other between the representatives of foreign governments.

Conclusion

11. After Brigadier Kassar's departure, the Iraqi Military Attache Colonel Hilmy, in the course of a chance meeting with me at the Lebanese Embassy reception on 23rd June, said that the Iraqi Air Force had no interest in the Lightning. He went on to say that General Shanshal had been disappointed to find during his visit here in April 1969 that when he had asked officially at the Ministry of Technology for a quotation for Jaguar

/he



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○ he had been told that the aircraft was not yet available for export. The General had also been keen to place an order for Ferrets, but that the price was too high.

12. Throughout the visit Brigadier Kassar appeared reluctant to engage in conversation on any matter of substance other than Air Force training. As far as I am aware, he made no mention of the Lightning in the course of any of his official conversations. General Hardan Takriti, when Commander of the Iraqi Air Force in 1963 and later that year and early in 1964 when Minister of Defence expressed his intention of obtaining, if possible - both aircraft and other military equipment from the United Kingdom. One could perhaps feel that he still had that desire and the ability to carry his colleagues with him, were he to pay a visit to the United Kingdom in the near future and request interviews with Ministers.



APPENDIX TO  
ANNEX TO ODR 704/7/1  
DATED: 25th JUNE 1969

PROGRAMME

VISIT OF BRIGADIER M. N. AL-KASSAR  
TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND  
MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY ON FRIDAY  
13th JUNE 1969

1100 Call on Vice Chief of the Air Staff,  
Air Marshal Sir Peter Fletcher, KCB, OBE, DFC, AFC.

1115 Call on Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operations),  
Air Vice-Marshal B.P.T. Horsley, CBE, MVO, AFC.

1130 Depart Ministry of Defence.

1140 Arrive Ministry of Technology, Stuart House.

1145 Meeting Chaired by Under Secretary, Export and  
International Relations, Mr. J.R. Christie.

1245 Luncheon at Kettners hosted by Mr. John Christie,  
for Ministry of Technology.  
1315

N.B. On this day Brigadier Kassar was accompanied by the whole  
of his Mission and Colonel O.C. Berger.



Ref. AP/32/021 ✓

27th June, 1969

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Aircraft sales to Iraq**

Thank you for your letter of 16th June about the prospects of selling the Lightning and Jaguar to Iraq.

You will have gathered from the recent press that the Middle East is a particularly difficult area for sales of military equipment. The announced Government policy is to avoid increasing the offensive capabilities of the countries involved in the present state of tension. The Foreign Secretary has stated, however, that this does not mean HMG would not supply military equipment, but that each transaction has to be looked at in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.

Quite apart from the political and strategic background, there are also important considerations of security, arising by virtue of Iraq's bias in attitude and military procurement towards the Eastern Bloc in recent years. Equally, both you and we should have to consider carefully the impact of negotiations to sell BAC aircraft in Iraq upon your guided weapons activities in Iran. The picture is further complicated by the suggestion from the Iraqis that any aircraft purchases should be hinged to a solution of the complex and long-standing dispute between them and the Iraq Petroleum Company over oil payments.

In short, Iraq is a far from easy instance to predict the sales prospects of military aircraft: of the two aircraft you mention, the chances of the Lightning being approved, since it is primarily an interceptor and could probably be offered in a form which would not pose unacceptable security penalties, are rather better than those of the Jaguar. Indeed, to associate the Lightning too closely with the Jaguar and other more offensive or sophisticated equipment could well jeopardise the prospects of Government approval for its sale.

For our part, since the resumption of diplomatic relations last year we have been trying to foster an atmosphere of improved relations with Iraq within which defence sales and other commercial activities can expand. For example, we have re-established the training links between the Iraqi Air Force and the RAF, and

/arranged

A.H.C. Greenwood, Esq., J.P.,  
Assistant Managing Director,  
British Aircraft Corporation Ltd.,  
Brooklands Road,  
Weybridge,  
Surrey.

Mr. Steffen 3/7  
(0730) hree  
this -

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2/7.

now Rq  
PMH  
2/7



arranged a number of visits by senior Iraqi military staff. So far, the Iraqi Minister of Defence - a decisive figure in any future defence purchases - has fought shy of accepting our invitation to visit this country officially, for what we can only assume to be domestic political reasons. But we have received officially an IAF delegation last September, a team headed by the Iraqi Director of Military Operations earlier this year, and we were very pleased to have official discussions with Gen. Kassab, whom you had invited over following the Paris Air Show.

Thus, whilst events are moving, progress is, of necessity, liable to be slower than you and we should like. Even so, we have obtained authority for you to pursue negotiations on the Lightning up to the point of contract terms, subject to reference to Ministers before an order is actually placed. Our advice, therefore would be to follow up these negotiations without jeopardising the prospects of the Lightning through introducing other equipments whose sensitivity on political and security grounds may well block any such order.

As you will no doubt know, Freddie Page discussed the whole issue with our Joint Parliamentary Secretary earlier this week, and what I have said reflects the views we expressed at this meeting.

J. R. CHRISTIE

Quite apart from the political and strategic background, there are also important considerations of security, arising by virtue of Iraq's position in the Middle East and military procurement towards the Eastern bloc in recent years. Naturally, both you and we should have to consider carefully the impact of negotiations to sell BAC aircraft in Iraq upon your guided weapons activities in Iraq. The picture is further complicated by the suggestion from the Iraqis that any aircraft purchased should be linked to a solution of the complex and long-standing dispute between them and the Iraq Petroleum Company over oil payments.

In short, Iraq is a far from easy instance to present the sales prospects of military aircraft. Of the two aircraft you mention, the chances of the Lightning being approved, since it is primarily an interceptor and could probably be offered in a form which would not pose unacceptable security penalties, are rather better than those of the Jaguar. Indeed, to accelerate the Lightning too closely with the Jaguar and other more offensive or sophisticated equipment could well jeopardise the prospects of Government approval for its sale.

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P. Hinchcliffe Esq.,

*With the Compliments of*

C.B. BENJAMIN

MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY

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Aircraft And Arms Sales To Iraq. Sale Of Aircraft And Equipment To Iraq. 27 June 1969. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/887. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107455823/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=dda0bcfa&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107455823/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=dda0bcfa&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.